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SUBSTANTIVE  REMEDIES
Hanoch Dagan* & Avihay Dorfman**
Often, private law remedies enforce or vindicate infringed underlying rights.  Substantive
remedies are different.  Substantive remedies do not aim at restoring these rights; nor do they seek
to change them.  Instead, substantive remedies adjust the remedial response for a right violation
so as to ensure post-wrong justice.  They require the law of remedies not merely to look back, but
rather to take a second look at the parties’ post-wrong situation.  At times, such a second look
affects the type of remedy awarded (damages in lieu of injunctive relief); in other cases—for
instance, the tort doctrine of crushing liability—it imposes a ceiling on the plaintiff’s compensa-
tion; and in yet other cases, dealing with loss of earning capacity or with the thin-skull rule,
remedies law’s second-look sets a compensatory floor below which compensation should not go.
This Article shows that these seemingly disparate rules and doctrines are not embarrassing
deviations from a traditional make-whole rule.  Rather, they all manifest a distinctively liberal
conception of remedies in private law, founded on the twin commitments to substantive freedom
and equality.  These commitments serve as the regulative ideals for the construction of respectful
interactions at the remedy stage between plaintiffs and defendants.
Highlighting the irreducible role of substantive remedies in a liberal system of remedies law
not only helps explain important pockets of the law and demonstrate their coherence.  It also
points to doctrinal confusions and failings.  To this extent, our account provides a source of
internal critique that can allow the law of remedies to make good on its latent affirmation of the
ideal of relational justice whereby participants at the remedial stage relate as genuinely, rather
than merely formally, free and equal persons.
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INTRODUCTION
So much has been written1 on remedies law’s classic Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co.,2 but virtually nothing has been said about the distinctive regime
of remedies to which it maps on—substantive remedies.  Substantive remedies
do not aim at restoring primary rights; nor do they seek to change them.
Instead, substantive remedies adjust the remedial response for a right viola-
tion so as to ensure post-wrong justice in a manner that takes seriously not
only the setback to the plaintiff but also the predicament of the defendant
going forward.
The Boomer court, announcing that its role is to “do justice between the
contending parties,”3 declined to enjoin a large cement plant despite the
finding that its operation amounted to a nuisance as to seven owners of
nearby properties, and notwithstanding the property damage it inflicted on
these properties in the form of dust and vibrations.4  Instead of invoking the
“drastic remedy” of injunctive relief, the court awarded “permanent dam-
ages” that aim at reflecting the “total economic loss to [plaintiffs’] property
present and future” caused by the nuisance.5  In that, Boomer resisted the idea
1 See infra text accompanying notes 30–46.
2 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
3 Id. at 873.
4 Id. at 871–72, 875.
5 Id. at 873.
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that remedies should serve to enforce the primary rights of the plaintiffs,6
which in this case would have meant sustaining their right to use and enjoy
their properties.7  It also declined to enlist remedies law in the service of
advancing “the general public welfare” by striking the optimal balance
between environmental concerns and economic prosperity at the state and
the national levels.8
Rather than either looking back at the plaintiffs’ primary rights or look-
ing forward at the general interest of society in order to determine what rem-
edy to grant, the court took a second look at the respective conditions of the
plaintiffs and the defendant at the post-wrong stage.9  The remedy in Boomer,
therefore, is neither about what the plaintiffs had all along nor is it about
what society should have; instead, it concerns the ex-post predicament of the
injurer as well as the setback to its victims.  An important factor in taking a
second look was the extreme disparity in the consequences of enjoining the
plant: whereas the total property damage to the plaintiffs amounted to
$185,000 (which at a later stage ended up being $710,000), the loss on the
defendant’s side came down to 300 employees and an investment in excess of
$45,000,000.10
We argue that Boomer exemplifies a distinctive regime of private law rem-
edies—of substantive remedies—and that this regime and its important doctri-
nal implications have gone virtually unnoticed in the theory and practice of
remedies law.  Remedies are substantive when they go beyond looking back
at the infringed underlying rights in order to adjust the remedial response
for a right violation so as to address both the plaintiff’s setback and the
defendant’s predicament.  Substantive remedies are, therefore, important in
and of themselves, that is, apart from remedies’ traditional role of enforcing or
vindicating primary rights.11  At times, as in Boomer, a second look at the par-
ties’ post-wrong respective conditions affects the type of remedy awarded; in
other cases—where the doctrines of crushing liability, collateral sources, or
structural payments apply—it imposes a ceiling on the plaintiff’s recovery;
and in yet other cases, such as the ones dealing with loss of earning capacity
or with the thin-skull rule, it sets a compensatory floor below which recovery
should not go.
This Article shows that these seemingly disparate rules and doctrines are
not embarrassing deviations from the make-whole principle, in which “the
primary remedial goal” is to try to restore “however imperfectly” the plain-
6 Id.; see also Stephen A. Smith, Rights and Remedies: A Complex Relationship, in TAKING
REMEDIES SERIOUSLY 31, 47 (Kent Roach & Robert J. Sharpe eds., 2010).
7 See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Mich. 1992).
8 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
9 See id. at 873.
10 Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 130 (2005).
11 On remedies law’s traditional role, see, for example, ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE
WRONGS 251 (2016); Smith, supra note 6, at 47.
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tiff’s “rightful position.”12  Rather, they all manifest a distinctively liberal con-
ception of remedies, founded on the twin commitments of the liberal legal
order to substantive freedom and equality (as opposed to negative liberty (or
independence) and formal equality).  These commitments serve as the regu-
lative ideals for the legal construction of respectful interactions at the remedy
stage between victims and wrongdoers (and, more generally, plaintiffs and
defendants).
Our conception of private law remedies carries important explanatory
and critical implications.  As a matter of explanation, we show that contrary
to the competing theoretical accounts of remedies law, the commitments to
self-determination and substantive equality find ample support in current
doctrine.  For instance, we develop a principled case for excusing tort
defendants from certain instances of crushing liability and in this way provid-
ing normatively superior foundations for the actual workings of the law.13
Concerning criticism, our liberal conception of private law remedies helps to
identify doctrinal confusions and failings.  For instance, we criticize the long-
standing practice of assessing loss of earning capacity by reference to the
victim’s race or gender (among other immutable traits), arguing that true
commitment to substantive freedom and equality in remedies law precludes
race- and gender-based damage computations.  To this extent, our account
provides a source of internal critique that can propel the law to make good
on its latent commitment to putting participants at the remedial level in a
position of relating as genuinely free and equal persons.
A pathbreaking contribution of our account of substantive remedies
relates to the remedy’s impact on the post-wrong predicament of the defen-
dant-wrongdoer.  A familiar way to introduce the matter is to consider the
application of the make-whole standard to a tortious encounter between an
economically poor student who inadvertently caused some damage to the
ridiculously expensive property of an unusually rich person.14  A major area
of remedies—compensatory damages—remains explicitly hostile to admit-
ting evidence as to the defendant’s situation in making remedial decisions.15
Tort theorists often take the matter to reflect a deeper point, namely, that a
tort victim is entitled to full compensation irrespective of whether she needs
the entire award to get her life back on track as it is hers as a matter of right;
and the wrongdoer is correspondingly required, independently of how
blameworthy her wrongdoing is, to pay the entire award even when it will
certainly get her life dramatically off its current track.16  As we argue below,
12 Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet Remedies, 38 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 71, 85 (2018).
13 See infra Section III.A.
14 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 304–05 (1992).
15 See, e.g., Eisenhauer v. Burger, 431 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying Ohio
law); Dawson v. Shannon, 9 S.W.2d 998, 999 (Ky. 1928).
16 See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 214 (2008); ALAN BRUDNER & JENNIFER M. NADLER,
THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW 141 n.75 (2d ed. 2013); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANAL-
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overlooking the defendant’s predicament in such a case may even seem inevi-
table from the perspectives of some influential efficiency theories as well as
corrective justice accounts.17
Our account, by contrast, rejects such a blanket disregard of the defen-
dant’s self-determination and the inequality that results if, and when, the
remedial response puts her in an impermissible state of unfreedom.  In fact,
we show that the actual practice of remedies law exhibits a more ambivalent
approach to the defendant’s post-wrong condition than is commonly
believed.  Consider these: the legal construction of an expansive category of
judgment-proof defendants,18 a trend among personal injury lawyers to limit
collectable compensatory damages to the sums available under the defen-
dant’s liability insurance,19 the rise and spread of liability insurance,20 the
growing trend toward abolishing the collateral-source rule,21 and the likely
tendency among juries of adopting a more forgiving stance toward individu-
als as opposed to business corporations.22  As in many practices, this list con-
sists of a hodgepodge of doctrines and conventions, not all of which can, or
should, be part of a principled account of substantive remedies.  But it does
cast doubts on the common view that the defendant’s post-wrong condition is
irrelevant.  We argue that oftentimes it is relevant, and set out to specify
under what conditions it should be so as a matter of right.23
YSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 387–88 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Jules
L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1248 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987);
SHAVELL, supra.).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 72–74, 84–87.  Lawyer-economists are willing to
consider defendants’ wealth for the different purpose of fixing their standard of due care.
See Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 414–15
(1992).
18 See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 714–15
(2006).
19 See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action,
35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 314 (2001).
20 ABRAHAM, supra note 16, at 1415.  The thought that liability insurance, including
even compulsory liability insurance, could entirely solve remedies law’s concern for the
substantive freedom and equality of the defendant fails for two independent reasons.  To
begin with, many individuals do not have sufficient resources to pay the premium. See infra
text following note 140.  Second, insurers may not always observe the insured’s level of care
(say, due to moral hazard) and, so, may not be able to link the terms of the policy insur-
ance to that level. See Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability
Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 RAND J. ECON. 63, 68–73 (2005).  For
empirical evidence showing that compulsory automobile insurance is partially responsible
for overall increase in traffic fatalities, see Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Auto-
mobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 358
(2004).
21 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 380, at 1059 (2000).
22 See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 131
(2016).
23 See infra text accompanying notes 136–43.
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We commence our discussion with Boomer, which has earned its place in
“the legal canon”24 as the exemplar of a proper “liability rule,” namely, a
form of entitlement protection, which is arguably conducive to economic
efficiency.25  Contrary to both its champions and critics, Part I argues that a
closer reading suggests that Boomer embodies the notion of substantive reme-
dies while denying the accounts of both law and economics and corrective
justice.  Part II systemizes the lessons of this illustration by developing the
normative framework that illuminates the Boomer decision.  It also defends
our position on the nature of the connection between primary rights and
remedies, and explains why a liberal conception of remedies law cannot mea-
sure the post-wrong conditions of the plaintiff and the defendant solely in
terms of the make-whole principle.  In that, we defend a bifurcated architec-
ture of remedies law: there are remedies whose essential role is that of
enforcing or vindicating—what we call looking back at—the terms of the inter-
action prior to their violation; and there are remedies that instantiate a
revised determination of—a sort of second-looking at—these terms.  In the
course of doing so we elaborate on how persons’ needs and interests in sub-
sistence, self-determination, and convenience bear on a liberal framework of
private law remedies.  Part II also begins to address the complex operational
challenge which this requirement entails, discussing both the way it might
offend the rule of law and the possible strategies for addressing this concern.
Part III shifts from theory to implications, showing how our account of
substantive remedies solves doctrinal puzzles and offers critical revisions in
tort remedies law (the reasons for our focus on tort remedies, as we explain
in due course, are neither arbitrary nor contingent).26  We show how the law
limits the potential devastating consequences of tort remedies on certain
wrongdoers, using the doctrines of crushing liability, collateral-source rule,
and structured payments as our points of reference.  We also explore the
mirror-image of this type of doctrines: cases in which rather than accommo-
dating the defendant’s post-infringement predicament, remedies law needs
to adjust its rules beyond what the make-whole approach allows in order to
give effect to the plaintiff’s substantive freedom and equality.  The doctrines
of loss of earning capacity and the thin-skull rule serve to illustrate this larger
point.
Finally, we conclude by considering the implications of our account for
the organization of remedies law as a field.  We argue that the bifurcated
architecture developed in this Article, consisting of both remedies that look
back, and those that take a second look, at the terms of the post-wrong inter-
action, should change the way we currently study, teach, and, indeed, think
24 Farber, supra note 10, at 113.
25 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalien-
ability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105–06, 1106 n.34, 1116 & n.55
(1972). Boomer also affected other bodies of law, such as environmental law, which we set
to one side.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 108–09.
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of remedies law, including most immediately the definition and the scope of
the make-whole formula.
I. REDISCOVERING BOOMER
Boomer has made a big splash in the theory and study of private remedies
law, forcing legal theorists to take firm positions for or against it.  The ensu-
ing debate, briefly summarized in Section A, took the Boomer court to have
enlisted the law of remedies in the service of aggregate social welfare by
granting the remedy that would generate the most efficient allocation of
resources.  But Boomer’s express reasoning suggests a very different reading,
which both its friends and its foes obscure.  Previous commentators have
already shown that, rather than engaging in social welfare maximization,
Boomer applies the traditional doctrine of undue hardship to decide whether
or not to grant an injunction.27  We go further than that, arguing that Boomer
makes it a powerful proving ground for the idea of substantive remedies.
Two key properties of the decision stand out: first, its emphasis on the
interdependence between the plaintiffs and the defendant which stands apart
from an interest in society’s overall welfare or justice; and second, its insis-
tence on taking seriously certain differences between the interacting parties as
opposed to treating them in the abstract, that is, as mere Ps versus D.  These
properties—interdependence and difference between the parties—form the
centerpiece of our intervention in the longstanding debates over the lesson
of Boomer.  They will also figure prominently in developing the general idea
of substantive remedies in the Sections that follow.
Before we begin, it is important to note that we take Boomer to be an
exemplar of substantive remedies under the assumption that the wrongdoing
on the part of the defendant against seven or some such particular home-
owners, not the entire community, is accidental, rather than deliberate.28  In
particular, the wrong committed by the defendant is neither an upshot of
deliberately mistreating the victims nor a calculated decision to place the
plant next to these victims in order to buy them off by paying compensatory
damages; were this the case, the court would likely not have awarded com-
pensatory damages in lieu of injunctive relief.29
27 See Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train
Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2012, at 1.  More recently, John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have observed that private nuisance law, including
Boomer, is best read as “[t]he harmonization of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s rights.”
JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 244 (2010).  While we share Goldberg
and Zipursky’s relational reading of Boomer, we argue that, at bottom, Boomer neither
attempts nor brings about harmonization among the rights of the contending parties.
Instead, it attempts to do justice, what we shall call relational justice, and this justice
focuses on the post-wrong terms of interaction, rather than the pre-wrong rights of these
parties as implicitly defined by the tort of private nuisance.
28 We could not find any indication, not to mention evidence, in the decision to
counter our assumption.
29 See infra text accompanying note 94; cf. infra text accompanying notes 114–18, 172.
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A. Happy Collectivization or a Wrong Turn?
Mainstream economic analysis of private law remedies applies a micro-
level analysis to Boomer, arguing that the court was correct in awarding com-
pensatory damages in lieu of injunction because the costs of enjoining this
plant exceed the benefits of allowing it to maintain its socially productive
operation.30  This is a micro-level economic analysis in the sense that it tack-
les the dispute by insulating it from the larger picture of industry-wide impli-
cations (for instance, whether there are other long-run consequences to
letting the plant go business as usual).31  Accordingly, other lawyer-econo-
mists have advocated a macro-level analysis in which the demands of efficient
resource allocation are determined by reference to institutional concerns.
Some would emphasize the long-term effects of watering down the right to
exclude other similar plaintiffs32 and others would use macroeconomic anal-
ysis to determine which remedy—injunctive relief or damages—makes more
sense.33  Plausibly, these diverse approaches have led lawyer-economists to
conflicting assessments of the Boomer outcome.
We take issue not with the disagreement among lawyer-economists, but
rather with the presupposition they all share: that the choice of remedy must
be made by reference to the remedy’s overall economic consequences for
society at large.34  This approach is now shared by scholars beyond the law
and economics tradition.35  But it is not without its critics.
Private law traditionalists conceptualize Boomer as an important, but
deeply unfortunate, wrong turn.  Such scholars view Boomer as objectionable
because it collectivizes private nuisance law by turning the choice of remedy
30 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 310, at 68–72 (7th ed. 2007);
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Dam-
age Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1079 n.10 (1980).
31 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
135–73, 261–63 (1970); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728–33 (1973).
32 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 1040–45 (2004).
33 See YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS
196–97 (2019).
34 It may be protested against our analysis that cases like Boomer are ultimately a matter
of public law.  This is because the dispute between the plant and the neighbors is the
outgrowth of a regulatory accident caused by ill-conceived zoning laws.  But this criticism
underappreciates the ineliminable place of interdependence and, so, relational justice in
our lived experience.  To be sure, we do not deny that some disputes can be avoided
entirely by proper planning.  We can designate industrial land use to some isolated areas to
preclude any possible interference with homeowners’ reasonable use of their properties.  It
is possible, though at times very costly, to reduce some of our conflicting activities in these
and other ways.  However, it is very unlikely that we can eliminate all of them, altogether.
This is precisely what we mean by emphasizing the fact of interdependence.  Accordingly,
at some point Boomer-like disputes are bound to surface and with them the paradigm of
relational justice—indeed, the only live question for the disputants in Boomer is one of
remedies, not zoning.
35 See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 113 (3d ed. 2010).
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into an exercise of cost-benefit analysis in the service of “considerations of
community advantage or wealth maximization.”36  There are two problems
with this transformation.  First, this approach permits Boomer to persist as an
instance of illegitimate authorization of a private entity, the defendant-plant,
to “expropriate at will” the rightful entitlements of the plaintiffs.37  Second,
such a reading of Boomer departs from a defining feature of private law—that
of operating within “legal categories that abstract from the particularity of
the interaction.”38  Private law traditionalists are thus united in opposing
every aspect of the Boomer decision, including its underlying welfarist theory,
commitment to cost-benefit analysis, and choice of remedy.39
B. Boomer Redux
Alternatively, we argue that Boomer rests on a concern with the parties’
rights, not with aggregate welfare.  Moreover, we find in Boomer a conception
of rights best cast in terms of relational justice.  The theory of substantive
remedies we develop in these pages is an immediate outgrowth of such a
conception.
Indeed, contrary to what both parties in the preceding debate suppose,
the Boomer court self-consciously rejects both the welfarist approach and the
application of cost-benefit analysis to the dispute at hand.  The Boomer court’s
approach to the private/public distinction nicely demonstrates the former
point.  The court is, of course, aware that every attempt at deciding such
rights may carry consequences that far exceed the rights of the private prop-
erty owners and the plant before it.  The perspective of the “general public
welfare” takes up the “public concern with air pollution,” and the scope of
this problem is not limited to the defendant, but rather represents an indus-
try-wide challenge that requires “full public and financial powers of govern-
ment.”40  But the court deems these society-wide consequences incidental to
what it takes itself to be doing, namely, settling a “private controvers[y],” and
“decid[ing] the rights of parties before it.”41
The court sides with the private law perspective not only due to consider-
ations of institutional capacity: that is, its inability to tackle the health, finan-
cial, scientific, and technological variables relevant to the question of air
36 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 195 (1995).
37 See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 104 n.53 (2012); see also RIPSTEIN, supra
note 11, at 126 n.9; Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict
Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 200 (1974).
38 WEINRIB, supra note 36, at 192.
39 One potentially important exception is George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 570 (1972).  Fletcher, however, does not disclose whether
the outcome of Boomer is desirable from a fairness perspective. Id.
40 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
41 Id.
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pollution.42  But also, the court asserts that “its essential function”43 is to “do
justice between the contending parties.”44
Furthermore, unlike its conventional welfarist reading, Boomer does not
in fact subscribe to the positions both lawyer-economists and private law tra-
ditionalists ascribe to it.  To begin with, Boomer does not question the primacy
of injunctive relief in nuisance cases—it does not replace the status of injunc-
tive relief as nuisance’s primary remedy with cost-benefit analysis45—but
rather implements a preexisting exception in the form of permanent damages
in substitution of an injunction.46  Moreover, and more importantly, cost-
benefit analysis does not inform the legal analysis even when the exceptional
situation of Boomer obtains.
There are two alternative ways to show the divergence between Boomer
and cost-benefit analysis.  First, choosing among remedies presupposes the
existence of a wrong—private nuisance is a wrong predicated upon interfer-
ence with the reasonable use or enjoyment of land.47  Reasonableness, in turn,
is a standard that, for lawyer-economists, cannot be specified independently
of cost-benefit analysis.  But must there be a wrong on a cost-benefit assess-
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 873.
45 Contra POSNER, supra note 30, § 3.10, at 69, 71–72; WEINRIB, supra note 36, at 195
n.57.
46 Indeed, even the leading English authority on equitable remedies for nuisance cited
by private law traditionalists as Boomer’s counterpoint leaves the door open for certain situ-
ations in which an injunction would be literally devastating for the defendant. See Shelfer
v. City of London Elec. Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch. 287 (AC) 322–23; see also WEINRIB, supra
note 36, at 195 n.56; Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 201 (2011).  In Shelfer, Lord Judge A.L. Smith articulated four
conditions that are jointly sufficient to warrant damages in lieu of injunction: plaintiff’s
injury is small, it can be measured in monetary terms, small amount of damages can be
deemed adequate, and injunctive relief would be oppressive to the defendant. Shelfer,
[1895] 1 Ch. at 322–23.  It is unclear whether Boomer meets these conditions (assuming
that the injury is regarded as “small” in relation to the defendant’s situation).  More impor-
tantly, it has been acknowledged that these conditions are not necessary ones, so that in
principle a Boomer-like situation may pass the discretionary bar of awarding damages in
substitution of an injunction. See Jaggard v. Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 (AC) 287;
Fishenden v. Higgs & Hill, Ltd. [1935] All ER 435 (AC) 448 (Romer L.J.); J.A. Jolowicz,
Damages in Equity—A Study of Lord Cairns’ Act, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 224, 248–51 (1975).  The
question of whether Boomer rightly presents its ruling in terms of rejecting the prevailing
remedial doctrine in New York has thus been subject to powerful criticisms. See Richard A.
Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091,
2101 (1997); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s
Accidental Revolution?  The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 226–28
(2012); Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals,
1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 354–57 (1990); Laycock, supra note 27, at 17.
47 See, e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971
(N.Y. 1977).  As the Copart court acknowledges, private nuisance can be actionable under a
theory of strict liability but only insofar as the interference takes the form of an abnormally
dangerous condition or activity. Id.
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ment?  If the benefits of letting the plant operate clearly exceed the costs to
the nearby property owners, then there should be no nuisance in the first
place.  And if so, there is nothing—no wrong—to remedy.48
Second, the court invokes a baseline of “large disparity” against which to
determine the (exceptional) desirability of damages over an injunction.49
The numbers cited to establish such a disparity—annihilating a $45 million
investment and 300 jobs versus a total property damage of $185,000—render
vivid the qualitative difference between mere cost-benefit analysis and the
Boomer decision.50  That is, the court is not interested in securing some posi-
tive surplus, not even a surplus with generous margins.  Rather, it is the con-
sequences that follow the complete devastation of the plant, which would
necessarily amount to terminating all its employees’ jobs and forgoing a
mega investment, that calls for awarding the exceptional remedy of
damages.51
C. Boomer and Equity Distinguished
Injunctive relief and the doctrine of undue hardship that supports dam-
ages in lieu of enjoining a nuisance are historical creatures of equity.  But
three reasons—formal, substantive, and functional—imply that Boomer’s
potential significance is not, at least need not be, confined to equity or to
equitable doctrines of private law remedies.
The formal reason is that the class of remedies we identify in Part III as
substantive remedies cuts across the division between equity and common
law.  Substantively, one might suppose that a remedy of injunctive relief
raises distinctive concerns due, in part, to its harsh consequences, which
explains the need for a special, equitable treatment of cases such as Boomer,
as opposed to most other cases of harm-based torts for which damages are
typically the only form of remedy available.  This suggestion is unwarranted
because the difference in consequences between injunctive relief and dam-
ages is at best quantitative, rather than qualitative.  Even an award of com-
pensatory damages can bring about harsh consequences for poor defendants
48 Our argument can also be contrasted with the following two views.  Gregory Keating
argues that the (only) wrong done by the defendant is that of failing to repair the harm
justifiably inflicted on the plaintiffs.  On this view, “[h]arm ought to be avoided if it can be
avoided, and amends must be made for its infliction if it cannot be avoided.”  Gregory C.
Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2012, at 1, 5.  Stephen Smith
argues that, in essence, the Boomer court denied the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defen-
dant threatened their primary rights. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND INJUS-
TICES: THE STRUCTURE OF REMEDIAL LAW 157 (2019).  We argue, in contrast, that Boomer
follows the traditional structure of private nuisance.  The defendant has wronged the plain-
tiffs by creating an unreasonable interference with their rights to enjoy their property.  The
novelty of the decision is, therefore, at the level of the remedy, rather than the wrong.
49 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872.
50 Id. at 873.
51 Id. at 872–73.
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(as when a defendant would have to compensate the plaintiff for accidentally
destroying a ridiculously expensive porcelain vase).
The most sophisticated way to resist our attempt to develop an account
of substantive remedies beyond equity lines comes from Henry Smith’s
account of equity as functionally, rather than formally or substantively, a “sec-
ond-order safety valve.”52  The function served by this safety valve, in this
view, is to guard against opportunistic behavior defined in terms of taking
unfair advantage of the existing set of first-order legal rules (typically, but not
necessarily, common-law rules).53 Boomer does not fit this functional pattern:
it concerns an accident, rather than a deliberate decision to target the plain-
tiffs by reducing their property rights into mere costs of producing cement;
indeed, Boomer involves a use-land conflict generated by nothing more than the
physical proximity between the parties.54  Smith acknowledges this much, but
nonetheless insists that there are problems other than opportunism for
which second-order intervention may be apt and perhaps even necessary, and
that one such problem goes under the heading “conflicting rights” and is
illustrated by reference to nuisance law, including Boomer.55
However, conflicting rights present themselves, after all, beyond the case
of nuisance law, including in core areas of apparently first-order law of com-
mon law such as negligence law, products liability, and contracts.56  At any
rate, Boomer and the class of substantive remedies to which it belongs do not
intervene in the second order, because there is no prior, first-order rules on
which they are supposed to operate.  The damages to which the plaintiffs in
Boomer are entitled are not some last-minute intervention, so to speak, in
their preexisting entitlement to injunctive relief.
52 Henry E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY 173, 183 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham eds., 2017).
53 See id. at 177–81.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.  The distinction between deliberately and
accidentally wronging the person or property of another stands on better grounds, morally
speaking, than the distinction between intentional activity accidentally producing wrongful
spillovers and accidental wrongdoing. Contra Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 65–66 (1979); Keating, supra note
48, at 19.  The latter distinction is deeply embedded in tort law—for instance, the old
distinction between the two basic forms of action, trespass and trespass on the case, tracks
this distinction.  But it fails to identify a qualitative moral difference between cases of negli-
gence and Boomer-like nuisance, on the one hand, and cases of reckless indifference and
deliberate wrongdoing, on the other. See infra text accompanying notes 111–21.
55 Smith, supra note 52, at 190–91.
56 There is another ambiguity in Smith’s depiction of nuisance law in terms of solving
a problem of conflicting rights which, on his account, calls for a second-order solution.
Smith begins this account with a discussion of traditional nuisance law’s approach to the
choice of remedy and then criticizes a modern development of nuisance law—and especially
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (AM. L. INST. 1979)—that does not go along with the
idea of operating as a second-order intervention in existing legal rules.  However, the
development he criticizes (quite rightly we think) does not concern itself with remedies,
but rather with the very different question of what counts as a nuisance to begin with. See
Smith, supra note 52, at 190–91.
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Damages in lieu of injunction can admittedly operate in the second
order, but only at the get-go stage of developing remedies law.  Thus, we
could imagine a historical moment in which the only available remedy for
nuisance was injunctive relief.  The first time (or first couple of times) a court
of appeals comes up with an exception in the form of damages makes it possi-
ble to conceive of this innovation as supplementing the first-order layer of
rules with a second-order layer.  This added layer will, at some point, be
assimilated into the former layer (and it does not matter, for our purposes,
whether the first-order layer is formally called law or equity).57
II. SUBSTANTIVE PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES
Boomer is indeed a landmark case, but its claim to prominence arises out
of two features that have so far slipped below the radar of legal scholars.
Contrary to the teachings of the economic analysis of law, Boomer takes a
single-mindedly relational approach, and in so doing implies that the defen-
dant-plaintiffs’ interdependence is a source of legal concern in and of itself;
quite apart from its overall consequences for society as a whole.  And con-
trary to the impersonalist commitment of private law traditionalists, Boomer
decides the remedies question by adopting a non-abstract conception of the
interacting parties—that is, the decision to award damages in lieu of an
injunction is influenced at every turn by “the particularity of the interac-
tion.”58  Thus, Boomer’s outcome is sensitive to the harsh consequences of
eliminating property damage that is disproportionately small relative to let-
ting this plant and its employees fall—evincing recognition of the signifi-
cance of interdependence and interpersonal difference.
Surely, the significance of these two features is not limited to remedies
for nuisance, or to the choice between injunction and damages.  But Boomer
can be viewed as Exhibit A of our account of substantive remedies: the under-
explored, indeed unappreciated, but nonetheless necessary part of remedies
law.  A part dedicated to a second look, rather than looking back, at the
parties’ entitlements.
But first, our reading of Boomer calls for a more explicit articulation of its
foundations.  While Boomer’s abstract references to justice and fairness can-
not serve as guideposts when we move beyond the distinct dispute at hand,
reliance on Boomer’s notions of interdependence and personal difference can
be much more informative.59  These ideas can serve as the building blocks of
57 The two rules of remedy for nuisance—injunction and damages—could have been
created simultaneously, in which case there is no space for two separate layers of legal
rules.  We take no stand on this historical question. Boomer was certainly not the first time
in which courts awarded damages in lieu of an injunction on account of undue hardship.
See supra note 46.
58 WEINRIB, supra note 36, at 192.
59 Methodologically speaking, our dissatisfaction with Boomer’s obscure language of
“do[ing] justice” fits nicely with our broader view that a successful legal theory need not be
committed to take the express reasoning of judges at face value.  Boomer v. Atl. Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).  While any adequate legal theory must respect
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a liberal conception of remedies law, predicated upon a commitment to self-
determination and substantive equality.
The liberal conception of remedies in private law disputes is a subset of
the broader legal category of private law, which makes it necessary briefly to
lay out what might a liberal conception of this broader category amount to.60
We then move to the centerpiece of the argument in which we present the
basic pillars of substantive remedies.  This Part concludes with a discussion of
the implementation of substantive remedies in legal doctrine.  In particular,
we address the question of how should a “second look” be instantiated with-
out undermining the parties’ primary rights or general constraints such as
those pertaining to the rule of law.
A. Relational Justice at the Level of Primary Rights
Talk of private law presupposes a distinction between the private and the
public.  In particular, this distinction is between two dimensions of our prac-
tical lives: the horizontal and the vertical ones.61  The horizontal dimension
picks out the primary rights and duties that define the terms of interactions
between private persons—for instance, tort law’s duty of care is owed to risk
takers on account of being foreseeably vulnerable to the risk created by the
duty holder, regardless of their nationality or membership in a certain politi-
cal community.  By contrast, the vertical dimension pertains to the rights and
duties that define the interactions between political authorities and their
subjects.
“[P]rivate law assumes the moral responsibility to determine just terms
of interactions among private persons.”62  Its most basic organizing ideas are
substantive freedom and equality.63  To treat a person as substantively free is
to enable her to make meaningful choices about the directions of her life,
judges’ express reasoning, there is no good reason to suppose that it must trump other
considerations that bear on the explanation of law. See Avihay Dorfman, Philosophical Foun-
dations of the Law of Torts, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://ndpr.nd.edu/
news/philosophical-foundations-of-the-law-of-torts/.  There is more to the question of what
is the law of private law remedies than the express reasoning of judges.  In other words,
although our interpretation of Boomer is more sympathetic to its reasoning than its conven-
tional depiction, our account of private law remedies neither relies nor depends on
Boomer’s reasoning.
60 We say might, rather than must, because our ambition is to explain the appeal of
substantive remedies even to those who have not subscribed to any particular conception
of private law, liberal or otherwise.  In that, substantive remedies can provide another rea-
son to support a liberal conception of private law along the lines we defend in the main
text below and elsewhere. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond
the Rawlsian Framework, 37 LAW & PHIL. 171 (2018) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Justice
in Private]; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395
(2016) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships].
61 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1396–97, 1413–15.
62 Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Postscript to Just Relationships: Reply to Gardner,
West, and Zipursky, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 261 (2017).
63 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1413–20.
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rather than merely to protect her from being subordinated to the will of
another.  And for parties in a private law interaction to relate as substantively
equals, their different normative and factual situations (for instance, asym-
metric information) must bear on the determination of the terms of their
interaction.  Terms of interactions that ignore the relevant differences may
give the parties equal treatment, but fail to treat them as equals.64
Furthermore, putting substantive freedom and equality at the moral
center of private law is critical in the light of two facts we mentioned in ana-
lyzing Boomer’s moral.  First is the fact of interdependence.  Our interdepen-
dent practical affairs can be the product of intentional planning (as in a
contract) as well as accidental happenstance (as in a typical negligence case).
The important point is that the pervasiveness of interdependence in our lives
makes the demands of substantive freedom and equality particularly relevant
and important for private law; any attempt to limit their purview to public
law, including the most elaborate and generous one, is bound to create an
enormous justice deficiency.  For instance, private discrimination in the
housing market is at bottom a horizontal wrong in the sense that no govern-
ment-supplied housing for the victims could launder the injustice of private
owners refusing to sell or lease their houses to other private persons on
account of who they are.65
The second fact pertains to personal difference.  It suggests that we all
constitute our own distinctive personhoods on the background of our pecu-
liar circumstances—that is, it is not only that we think differently, but we also
pursue different ground projects, possess different traits, and confront differ-
ent life’s challenges.  Against this backdrop, the thought that formal freedom
and equality can render private law’s terms of interaction sufficiently just
must be resisted.  Difference (and interdependence) may matter, and greatly
at that.
Thus, for example, the question of how much care is required in the
face of a physically or mentally disabled passerby can only be properly
addressed when the relevant difference that exists between the risk creator
and the passerby is brought to bear on the standard of due care.66  In partic-
ular, this standard must address the problem of vulnerability imbalance that is
distinctively formed when one person pursues an end that happens to place
the physical security of another in danger.67  The imbalance picks out the
difference between death and serious injury, on the one hand, and con-
straints on setting ends and pursuing them, on the other.  As a result, in
determining the standard of care owed to a physically disabled passerby, con-
temporary tort law rightly insists that the risk creator “is obliged to afford that
64 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1978).
65 See Dagan & Dorfman, Justice in Private, supra note 60, at 174–79.
66 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1431–35; Avihay Dorfman,
Negligence and Accommodation, 22 LEGAL THEORY 77, 111–14 (2016).
67 Id. at 1432.
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degree of protection which would bring to the notice of the person so
afflicted the danger to be encountered.”68
Determining the terms of interactions based on the liberal commitments
to substantive freedom and equality extends far beyond the standard of due
care to capture primary rights, duties, and powers in areas such as torts, con-
tract, property, and the law of restitution.  Setting these terms right is crucial
even in an otherwise perfectly just society—even there, private law should
empower and guide people by establishing just terms of interactions.69  This
task is no less crucial in our imperfectly just (or simply unjust) society—when
people whose rights have been (or are about to be) infringed seek remedial
response.  Because the facts of interdependence and difference are no less
significant at this remedial stage, their normative implications should loom
large on the terms of the post-wrong interactions between plaintiffs and
defendants.
The main claim of this Part is that a normative framework of relational
justice, among possible other liberal accounts of private law justice, requires a
remedial scheme that further instantiates substantive freedom and equality.
This scheme has a bifurcated structure so that remedies are split between
taking a look back at the primary rights and duties of the interacting parties
and taking a second look at the parties’ interaction in order to determine the
appropriate remedial response to rights violations.  Looking back is a mani-
festation of robust continuity between rights and remedies; whereas second-
looking represents some discontinuity between the two.  In order to develop
this claim, we first need to elaborate on the right/remedy interface.
B. Between Rights and Remedies
The notion of substantive remedies opposes two contrasting accounts of
the relationship between rights and remedies—the traditional “make-whole”
view and its disjunctive counterpart.  Familiar as they are, both reductive
views fail descriptively and normatively.  Remedies respond to violations of
just terms of interactions, and thus, contrary to the disjunctive view, cannot
plausibly be understood independently of the rights that ground them.70
But because private law’s fundamental maxim of relational justice applies to
the parties’ remedial encounter just as much as it applies to their pre-wrong
relationship, the traditional “make-whole” idea is no more defensible.
68 Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 338 P.2d 743, 746 (Wash. 1959).  The same need not,
and indeed should not, apply in the inverse case of a physically disabled risk-creator.
There, tort law typically imposes an unaccommodating, objective standard of care. See
Dorfman, supra note 66, at 90–92, 112–13.
69 See Avihay Dorfman, Relational Justice and Torts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE
LAW THEORY 321, 325 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky eds., 2020); Dagan & Dorf-
man, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1438–60.
70 See WEINRIB, supra note 37, at 98, 102, 106–08.
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1. Avoiding Remedy Reductionism
The clearest articulation of the disjunctive approach is embedded in the
celebrated Calabresi-Melamed framework.  For Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed, liability rules—alongside property rules—belong to the second
stage of resource allocation; that is, after making its initial choice of entitle-
ments, the law of remedies needs to decide on the manner of protecting
these entitlements.71  This makes private law rights and remedies normatively
independent; parallel instruments in the service of the public good.72  For
the remedial stage, Calabresi and Melamed’s scheme offers a choice between
two rules: first, a property rule compels “someone who wishes to remove the
entitlement from its holder [to] buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller”; and second,
a liability rule allows one to “destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to
pay an objectively determined value for it.”73
This framework informs some economic analyses of remedies law, in
which remedies are legal incentives designed to maximize overall social wel-
fare.74  Different variations on the disjunctive view have also been developed
outside the economic analysis of law, suggesting that some areas of remedies
law (such as compensatory and super-compensatory damages) are better
understood in terms of empowering private persons to enlist the court in the
service of attaining publicly administered vindication of their infringed
rights.75  These latter accounts begin with the truism that some remedies,
such as compensatory damages for bodily injury, might not make the victim
whole.76  One such account even analogizes the remedial stage in matters of
awarding wrong-based damages to criminal law fines that purport to commu-
71 Id. at 107.
72 See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER & ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING
TORTS, CONTRACTS, AND RESTITUTION 12 (2014).
73 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 25, at 1092.
74 Thus, in a typical negligence dispute the kind and the size of the remedy should be
determined based on its ability to bring about optimal deterrence by inducing potential
wrongdoers to internalize the costs of their risky activities.  The answer may be compensa-
tory damages; but it can also point out to super-compensatory damages, under-compensa-
tory damages, or none at all. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for
Accidents, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 249–55, 274 (2015); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 888–90 (1998); Richard A.
Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735,
737 (2006).  Essentially, it depends on the social gains the remedy can secure, rather than
on the terms of the interaction it establishes between the wrongdoer and the victim.
75 See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436 (2006); Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2012); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 695 (2003).
76 See Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
107, 111–12 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 18  8-DEC-20 9:30
530 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
nicate public acknowledgement of rights violations, as opposed to making
the right-holder whole.77
The radically disjunctive view, in which prescribing remedies is exoge-
nous to the parties’ rights, cannot be correct.78  It is true that “any significant
bodily injury” is, to an important extent, “an irreparable injury” so that com-
pensatory damages may not literally make the victim whole.79  But this truism
does not imply that apart from traveling back in time to eliminate past
wrongdoing there is no second-best response that vindicates the legal rights
the victim has had all along.  Producing a second-best is part of what the
concept of remedy means.  The law of remedies aims at addressing depar-
tures from the dictates of private law’s primary duties—it is the law’s backup
plan in case these duties have been ignored (inadvertently or otherwise).
Therefore, the radically disjunctive view must be rejected.80
And yet, the traditional make-whole picture, according to which courts
focus solely on the primary right of the plaintiff when deciding what remedy
to award, does not follow.  To begin with, the provision of remedies may
often be complicated due to institutional considerations that may bear on
how courts resolve disputes.81  It is thus not clear whether there is (or has
been) an account that casts the rights/remedies relation in the robust terms
of transubstantiation or rubber stamp.82  A more plausible description of a
nondisjunctive relation between remedies and primary rights (namely: the
traditional make-whole view) is therefore one of effort, rather than out-
77 See SMITH, supra note 48, at 202; Smith, supra note 75, at 1753–54.  Smith comes to
this conclusion based, in part, on his understanding of the point of the prepayment rule,
according to which fully compensating the victim of a wrong prior to her bringing a suit
does not count as a defense, so that the wrongdoer would be compelled to compensate the
victim once again.  Smith, supra note 75, at 1742, 1744–49; see also SMITH, supra note 48, at
196.  However, it is unclear whether such an inference is warranted.  The prepayment rule
is better viewed as standing for purely instrumental reasons—it precludes real-life disagree-
ments and violence that will likely occur when the enforcement of substantive rights can be
made independent of court rulings. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Against Private
Law Escapism: Comment on Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs, 14 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD.
37, 43 & n.24 (2016).  For a thoughtful historical analysis finding support for casting tort
remedies in terms of a private law analog of criminal punishment, see Goldberg, supra
note 75, at 438–47, 459–62.
78 See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING
PRIVATE LAW THEORY 144–45 (2013).  For other reasons to resist the public law conception
of private law remedies, see, for example, Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note
60, at 1400–09.
79 Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort
Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 163 (2011).
80 See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J.
1335, 1339–40, 1342–43, 1345, 1369–71 (1986).
81 See Smith, supra note 6, at 33, 39, 43–47, 49–52, 55, 57–60; see also Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 407, 433, 436
(2016).
82 The rubber stamp metaphor comes from Smith, supra note 6, at 47.
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come—remedies purport to enforce primary rights, while leaving some room
for institutional considerations.83
The clearest articulation of this view is the corrective-justice approach to
private law, and especially the Kantian variation on this theme.84  The rem-
edy, in this view, piggybacks (or even instantiates) the right and therefore its
role is strictly one-sided: it focuses solely on the victim’s pre-wrong right vis-à-
vis the defendant, and thus only on the victim’s post-wrong entitlement to be
made whole again.85  For the victim, and for the victim only, the remedy pur-
ports to make it as if her means had not been wrongfully damaged.86  After
the wrong, the wrongdoer is conceived as the agent of the victim’s restora-
tion and the remedy is single-mindedly victim oriented.  Thus, although the
corrective-justice approach emphasizes the relational structure of remedies
in private law, there is nothing in the pre- or post-wrong condition of the
defendant that could bear on its make-whole analysis.87  In other words, it is
relational, but only in a purely nominal sense as there is nothing in the defen-
dant’s condition that makes a difference in the legal analysis at the remedy
stage.
Our reading of Boomer suggests that disregarding the parties’ post-wrong
relational predicament is troublesome.  Courts should sometimes take a sec-
ond-look at the primary rights of the plaintiff while deciding the remedy
question.  In particular, they should consider whether to refrain from fully
enforcing the primary rights of the victims, say, on account of the substantial
disparities in the consequences of insisting on a make-whole remedy.  Take
the Boomer example, where insisting on the make-whole approach would have
amounted to entirely shutting down the defendant’s plant and terminating
all its employees in order to avoid a relatively small property damage to the
plaintiffs.
Understanding Boomer as taking the form of a second-look remedy also
distinguishes our analysis from another variation on the make-whole theme
83 Cf. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 753–57, 763 (1917).
84 The Kantian approach can accommodate—using the concept of systematicity—
institutional limitations on the make-whole aspirations of remedies in private law. Cf.
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 238,
251–52 (2009); Ernest J. Weinrib, Private Law and Public Right, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 191,
196–97 (2011).
85 See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 37, at 61, 88–89, 117; cf. John Gardner, What is Tort
Law For?  Part 1.  The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 11–12 (2011).
86 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 245–61.
87 In a recent study, Ripstein observes that the corrective-justice account of making the
plaintiff whole is not about restoring “the condition of either [party] in relation to their
own previous condition,” but rather about reversing a wrongful transaction so as to restore
“how things stand between the parties.”  Arthur Ripstein, Corrective Justice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY, supra note 69, at 255, 258.  Once again, characterizing R
it in terms of reversing a transaction does not change the fact that there is nothing in the
defendant’s post-wrong condition that could make a difference in the legal analysis recom-
mended by this corrective-justice approach.
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recently defended by Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz.  On that variation,
remedies fully reflect back on the nature of the rights they enforce.  For
instance, a compensatory damages remedy reflects a primary right to the
value of the thing, rather than to the thing itself.88  We do not take issue with
the distinction between right to value and right to the thing itself.89  How-
ever, we resist Markovits and Schwartz’s attempt to characterize the object
protected by a primary right purely in terms of the remedy awarded for its
violation.  The fact that a default remedy takes the form of compensatory
damages does not necessarily make it the case that the object protected by the
primary right is its mere value.90  While the default remedy for conversion is
damages measured by the thing’s value,91 it is false to suppose that one could
get away with deliberately taking a generic chattel and paying up front its
market value to the right-holder.92  Moreover, much of tort law resists this
much: a deliberate attempt unilaterally to convert a duty of care (or any
other duty whose violation triggers compensatory damages) into a liability
rule typically gives rise to super-compensatory damages.93
The same is true with respect to a nuisance case in which a cement plant
would unilaterally make a deliberate decision to target nearby neighbors by
reducing their property rights into mere costs of producing cement.  Unlike
the accidental—viz., nondeliberate—wrongdoing in Boomer, the deliberate
infliction of nuisance will be an instance meriting injunctive relief and possi-
bly also an award of punitive damages.94  Contrary to the near-perfect match
between rights and remedies marshaled by Markovits and Schwartz, our
approach to Boomer suggests that awarding damages in lieu of injunction
reflects a substantive gap between the primary rights of the plaintiffs and the
remedy to which they are entitled.  This gap reflects remedies law’s commit-
ment to determining post-wrong terms of interactions among substantively
88 See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Rights and Remedies in Private Law (Novem-
ber 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  One of us offered in the past
a similar view. See Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. TORT L., no. 1, 2011,
at 1, 4.  As we note below, we do not disagree with the analysis Markovits and Schwartz offer
in connection with remedies for breach of contractual interactions. See infra text accompa-
nying note 108.
89 Compare ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM
AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 30–79 (2018), with Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets?  Wel-
fare, Autonomy, and the Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1289, 1298–1300, 1305–06 (2019)
(reviewing POSNER & WEYL, supra).
90 See Charlie Webb, Duties and Damages, 1 OXFORD STUD. PRIV. L. THEORY (forthcom-
ing 2020).  The tendency to reduce a remedy of compensatory damages to a regime of pay-
as-you-go liability is common in the law and economics literature. See, e.g., Ariel Porat,
Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189,
199–200 (2009).
91 We refer to damages as conversion’s default remedy in recognition of traditional, far
less (then and certainly now) common actions such as replevin and, especially, detinue.
92 See Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc., 378 P.3d 1090, 1096 (Kan. 2016);
Nacol v. Metallic Dev. Corp., 614 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
93 See infra text accompanying notes 111–21.
94 DOBBS, supra note 21, § 468, at 1338.
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free and equal parties by taking a second look at their respective conditions.
Simply put, Boomer exemplifies the idea of substantive remedy.
2. The Missing Category of Substantive Remedies
We argue that there is a fundamental reason, a noninstitutional one,
that justifies discontinuities between remedies and rights.  That is, private
law’s remedial apparatus should give effect to the same normative commit-
ments that determine the pre-wrong terms of interaction among private per-
sons.  In other words, taking seriously private law’s conception of just terms
of interpersonal interactions should carry immediate implications not only
for the doctrines that establish primary rights and duties such as the duty of
due care,95 but also for those that address their violations.  The normative
impact of substantive freedom and equality on private law cannot stop at the
stage of determining what primary rights we have.  It also informs the ques-
tion concerning the proper remedies for cases of rights violations given the
remedies’ impact on the respective conditions of the parties, going forward.
One implication of this proposition, which goes beyond our current
inquiry, deals with instances when private law remedies fail effectively to vindi-
cate this commitment.  Unlike civil recourse theorists who insist that private
law remedies are the defining feature of private law (or of tort law only),96
our conception of relational justice allows for nontraditional remedial
schemes to supplement and, if necessary, supplant private law remedies as in
the cases of workers’ compensation schemes in lieu of some areas of negli-
gence law.97  What counts as “private law” cannot be determined exclusively
by the entitlement of a victim to pursue her wrongdoer in a court.98  Nor,
you would recall, can it be determined exclusively by reference to the appara-
tus’s legal source—the common-law system does not exhaust the universe of
private law’s legal sources.99  Rather, alternative remedial apparatuses may
function as responses to violations of private law’s primary rights and duties
95 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1430–35; Dorfman, supra
note 66, at 111–14.
96 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 918, 973 (2010).
97 See Dorfman, supra note 69, at 326–27.  Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra
note 60, at 1436–37; see also Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Other Half of Regulatory
Theory, 52 CONN. L. REV. 605, 631–37 (2020).
98 See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, The Value of Rights of Action: From Civil
Recourse to Class Action, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 14)
(on file with authors).  Furthermore, the civil-recourse test is widely overinclusive because
it applies far beyond private law to quintessential public law areas such as constitutional
rights law. See Avihay Dorfman, Private Law Exceptionalism?  Part I: A Basic Difficulty with the
Structural Arguments from Bipolarity and Civil Recourse, 35 LAW & PHIL. 165, 177–85 (2016).
In their recent book, Goldberg and Zipursky do not repeat this claim. See JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020).
99 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1397; see also Sandy Steel,
On the Moral Necessity of Tort Law: The Fairness Argument, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcom-
ing 2020) (on file with authors).
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insofar as they are best seen as giving effect to the twin commitments to sub-
stantive freedom and equality underlying relational justice.
Our focus here, however, is on those doctrines in which courts are
responsible for remedying an infringement of a plaintiff’s right.  On its face,
analyzing them from the perspective of relational justice should be trivial
since these rights are already properly grounded in the liberal commitment
of reciprocal respect to self-determination and substantive equality (or at
least so we have argued in the previous Section).  Why isn’t it enough, then,
for the law to confine itself to looking back at the normative implications that
are already embedded in the primary rights themselves?  Put differently, why
isn’t it enough to resort to the make-whole measure of reestablishing the
plaintiff’s rightful, pre-wrong condition?  The answer we are about to give
reveals a dimension of remedies severely obscured by the traditional under-
standings—this is the dimension through which courts take a second look at
the parties’ interaction by examining the justness of the post-violation terms of
the interaction.100  Second-looking expresses substantive gaps between pri-
mary rights and the remedies provided in response to their violations.  A
principle of second-looking gives rise to what we have been calling substantive
remedies.
C. Second-Looking Remedies
Remedies help to enforce and further specify the primary rights and
duties and, in this way, give effect to the pre-wrong terms of private law inter-
actions.  Enforcement requires a straightforward looking-back at the primary
rights and duties of the parties.  And further specification means that at times
courts invoke the remedial stage to articulate in a more concrete way the
content of the primary rights and duties so as to determine what it would
really mean to engage in looking back at these rights and duties.
But remedies are also normatively important in and of themselves, that is,
apart from functioning as look-back means with which to sustain and fill out
the content of primary rights and duties.  Substantive remedies operate at the
post-wrong stage to ensure that parties to an interaction that literally went
wrong relate at the remedial stage as substantively free and equal private per-
sons.  Because the fundamental commitment of private law to relational jus-
tice must not fade away at the remedial stage, private law should see to it that
its remedial apparatus be adjusted accordingly.  This is why liberal remedies
law must have a second-look principle tasked with the provision of substan-
tive remedies.101  For rule-of-law considerations of finality of adjudication,
100 Our talk of “interaction,” as in post-wrong interactions and just remedial interac-
tions, is not limited to social relationships (say, among colleagues, neighbors, or even
between mere acquaintances) as it can also capture legally constructed interactions among
strangers, which is an instance of a juridical interaction or relationship.
101 Recall that, appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, second-looking does not
operate in the second order.  The remedies governed by the looking-back and second-
looking principles make up the entire complex of the first-order law of private law
remedies.
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judgment, and law more generally,102  our account of substantive remedies
begins and ends with second-looking even if remedies law could implement a
principle of third-, fourth-, or nth-looking.
The case for substantive remedies becomes particularly potent in the
face of the two facts mentioned above—interdependence and personal dif-
ference.103  These facts are crucial not only at the level of primary rights and
duties as when the law sets the terms of the interaction, say, by determining
the standard of due care.  Indeed, interdependence is at its peak when a
defective interaction between a duty-ower and a right-holder puts the parties
in a victim/wrongdoer relation.  At this point, the interests of the parties are
firmly interlocked since, all else equal, the injury of the victim and its rectifi-
cation are deemed the injurer’s, rather than the state’s, responsibility.104
Furthermore, the relevant difference in the parties’ factual and normative
situations may loom large on the determination of the remedy and its size as
the Boomer decision exemplifies.  A theory of private law remedies should
address the parties’ post-wrong interdependence and personal difference
and provide a systematic articulation of the implications of ensuring the just
terms of their post-wrong interaction.  This is why our theory emphasizes sec-
ond-looking as an additional principle that, along with looking-back, cap-
tures how remedies law should work.
The most fundamental proposition of such a theory is that private law
remedies should aspire to put the wrongdoer and the victim in a relation of
substantive freedom and equality with one another.  This account—in sharp
contrast to the approaches we have just criticized—takes a distinctively rela-
tional approach to remedies law.  Because remedies determine the terms of
post-wrong interactions between wrongdoers and their victims, the question
that presents itself is the terms’ compliance with the demands of relational
justice.  Therefore, the organizing idea for the private law of remedies should
be not one of restoring the victim to her pre-wrong situation.  Rather, it is a
relational one: the remedy must put the parties in a relationship of substan-
tive equality among self-determining persons.105
Thus, disregarding the post-wrong condition of the defendant is no
mere blind spot that lawyer-economists and corrective-justice theorists can
effortlessly address by adding it into the equation.  It represents a deeper
difficulty: the normative frameworks they employ to explain and justify pri-
vate law remedies fail to acknowledge, and often reject, liberalism’s two most
fundamental commitments to substantive freedom and equality.  Just like the
102 See, e.g., Timothy A.O. Endicott, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 19 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–11 (1999).
103 See supra Section II.A.
104 We say all else equal in recognition of situations, mentioned above, in which reme-
dial responsibility is legitimately collectivized, as in workers’ compensation schemes. See
supra text accompanying note 97.
105 The operational aspects of implementing substantive remedies are taken up in Sec-
tion II.D.
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lawyer-economists’ sole attention to social welfare,106 the corrective justice’s
sole focus on the pre-wrong entitlement of the victim necessarily overlooks
both the wrongdoer’s self-determination and the inequality that results if,
and when, the remedial response puts the latter in a relation of subordina-
tion to the former.107
In some cases, adding the defendant’s post-wrong condition to the equa-
tion does not make a practical difference.  At times, this is because making
the plaintiff whole does not generate a post-wrong interpersonal injustice so
that there is no need to apply a principle of second-looking.  More impor-
tantly, there are two categories of cases in which the law of remedies may
justifiably pursue its looking-back function single-mindedly that would result in
disregarding the defendant’s post-wrong condition: one category pertains to
ex ante voluntary allocations of risks, especially contractual ones; the other
refers to egregious misconduct on the part of the wrongdoer.  We take each
category in turn.
The main reason for our focus on adopting a principle of second-look-
ing in and around tort, rather than contract, remedies has to do with the
nature of the contractual form of interaction.  As Justice Holmes famously
noted, “unlike the case of torts, as the contract is by mutual consent, the
parties themselves, expressly or by implication, fix the rule by which the dam-
ages are to be measured,” and contract law’s remedial rules by and large
serve as majoritarian defaults.108  We do not argue, to be sure, that all of
contract remedies must belong to this category.  But insofar as this category
does apply, it suggests that the parties have—either explicitly or by not opt-
ing out of the pertinent default—already allocated the risks and the costs of
their post-breach predicament.  Remedies law should by and large simply
respect this much and, so, withhold second-looking.109  The flip side of the
same coin is that in contract law what may seem, at first sight, as an instance
of a second-look remedial response is oftentimes better analyzed as looking
back at the parties’ primary rights.  The mitigation principle, which imposes
on promisees the burden of taking cost-justified steps to mitigate (or avoid
aggravating) the promisor’s damages for breach of contract, is a prime exam-
ple for this point.110
If the first category in which remedies law should only look back at the
primary rights of the parties involves breakups in what started as a mutually
106 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  The rejection of the pair-wise perspective
is vividly on display when lawyer-economists analogize a torts plaintiff to a private version of
an attorney general. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J.); Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts—The Case of Punitive Damages, in
EXPLORING TORT LAW 333, 337 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
107 Recall that while the corrective justice theory of private law rights is famously rela-
tional, its account of private law remedies is only nominally relational. See supra text
accompanying notes 85–86.
108 Globe Refin. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903).
109 This is where we substantively agree with Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 88.
110 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 967 (1983).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 25  8-DEC-20 9:30
2020] substantive  remedies 537
consensual relationship, the second category, egregious wrongdoing, lies at
the other extreme.  This category takes up the case of a wrongdoer exhibit-
ing (at minimum) reckless indifference of the plaintiff’s right.111  There are,
to be sure, cases in which a defendant engages in deliberate but nonmali-
cious imposition on the plaintiff’s right.112  Setting them aside, cases of genu-
inely malicious wrongdoings justify ignoring the defendant’s post-wrong
predicament upon deciding the remedy.113
A straightforward example is the doctrine of punitive damages.  Con-
sider Cashin v. Northern Pacific Railway,114 in which construction workers
engaging in boulder removal decided to exercise far less care than legally
required to protect nearby houses and their occupants.115  Their failure was
not merely one of inadvertence or lack of professionalism; instead, these
workers “knowingly employed the method which . . . might cause injury or
death . . . in order to speedily and economically dispose of the threatening
boulder, believing that it was to the advantage of the defendant [employer]
to do so and pay for the damage done.”116  The court approved an award of
punitive damages on the basis of this finding.117  On the relational-justice
approach, a remedy of punitive damages is the functional equivalence of
injunctive relief; more concretely, it is, and should be reconceived by courts
as, injunctive relief granted ex post.118
It is clear that had the plaintiff, an occupant of a nearby dwelling house,
known that her safety was being taken hostage by the defendant’s cost-benefit
analysis, she would have been able to ask a local court to either enjoin the
blasting operation or instruct the defendant to implement the necessary pre-
cautions.119  The underlying idea is one of relational justice: injunctive relief
ensures against (gross) violations of the freedom- and equality-respecting
terms of the interaction between the defendant, a risk-creator, and the plain-
tiff, the risk-taker.  This idea cannot simply fade away after the fact when the
risk has materialized into injury.
111 On the connection between malicious behavior and reckless indifference (or some
such), see Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358, 359–60 (1866).
112 See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910).
113 We say malicious wrongdoing because a purely malicious state of mind accompanying
perfectly legitimate behavior should not trigger liability in a liberal legal order. See Corp.
of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] 73 LT 353 (HL) 353 (appeal taken form Eng.).
114 See Cashin v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 28 P.2d 862, 864, 868 (Mont. 1934).
115 The untaken precaution is that of “mud-capping” or “plastering” the boulders to
prevent damage to nearby people and property. Id. at 867.
116 Id. at 870.
117 Id. at 870–71.
118 For an earlier development of this theme, see Avihay Dorfman, What is the Point of
the Tort Remedy?, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 153–62 (2010); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Tort
Entitlement to Physical Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regu-
lations, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 400 (2014).
119 Note that the fact that blasting may have counted as abnormally dangerous activity
does not relieve the defendant of exercising due (or even utmost) care. Cf. Gregory C.
Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 292,
294 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
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Just as it commands ex ante intervention in the form of injunctive relief,
so does the idea of relational justice require ex post intervention to reinstate
just terms of interactions.  A stand-alone remedy of compensatory damages
cannot do the work since it would merely reinforce the workers’ strategy of
reducing—and, indeed, commodifying—the life and limb of the plaintiff to
“a mere cost of doing business.”120  Super-compensatory damages provide
the anticommodification measure against the conversion of the workers’ duty
to respect the plaintiff as substantively free and equal person into a standard
of pay-as-you-go liability.  A remedy of punitive damages appropriately adopts
a looking-back approach to determining just terms of interaction at the
expense of implementing a second look.121  Against this backdrop, we can
now return to substantive remedies and the principle of second-looking to
which they give rise.
D. Substantive Remedies in Action
The argument has so far established the significance of a freestanding
inquiry into the post-wrong interaction between parties in a private law dis-
pute.  The inquiry is freestanding because the liberal maxim of reciprocal
respect to substantive freedom and equality determines not only the pre-
wrong terms of interaction, but also the terms that govern the remedial inter-
action between the plaintiff and the defendant.  We have also demonstrated
that this inquiry need not be conducted by vague references to justice and
fairness á-la the Boomer court.  We now look at the ways in which the examina-
tion of relational justice at the remedial stage can be worked out into reme-
dies law.  In particular, we address the substantive remedies toolkit, the way
remedies law can adhere to the rule of law, and the four guidelines that the
law of substantive remedies follows.
1. The Remedial Toolkit
A remedies law that does not allow any second look could simply look
back at the parties’ primary rights.  But one that takes relational justice seri-
ously cannot use such a straightforward scheme, since post-wrong considera-
tions might affect the just result.  In particular, post-wrong considerations of
relational justice pick out a remedial ceiling as well as a floor.
Ceiling.  Outside of the cases of contract and egregious misconduct
noted above, giving effect to a victim’s infringed right cannot come at the
120 Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (1993); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law and the Inherent
Limitations of Monetary Exchange: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and the Negligence Rule, 4 J.
TORT L., no. 1, 2011, at 1, 8–9.
121 However, concerns for the financial annihilation of the defendant in the case of
punitive damages may place outer limits on the pursuit of looking back, though not neces-
sarily for the sake of pursuing second-looking. See, e.g., Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beck-
with, 989 P.2d 882, 887–88 (Nev. 1999); Sherman v. McDermott, 329 A.2d 195, 197 (R.I.
1974).
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expense of denying the wrongdoer his or her self-determination and equal
standing, going forward.  Defining such a ceiling is important because the
victim and the wrongdoer cannot relate as substantively free and equal if by
redressing the setback to the victim the wrongdoer is required to make an
excessive sacrifice of his or her basic ability to function as a self-determining
and equal person.  Awarding damages in lieu of injunctive relief on Boomer-
like grounds of undue hardship is an obvious example.  But the case for set-
ting a ceiling is not exhausted by the excessive consequences of enjoining the
defendant.
It is also necessary to protect (nonwillful) wrongdoers whose financial
situation does not allow them fully to compensate the victim and maintain
minimally decent self-determining lives.  To appreciate the meaning of this
maxim, we characterize the notion of the defendant’s predicament by refer-
ence to three normatively different layers of vulnerability—concerning the
defendant’s subsistence, self-determination, and convenience.122  Relational
justice implies that remedies law should not (and, as we will see, by and large
does not) limit its concern for the defendant’s predicament to the first, most
skeletal layer.  Rather, a commitment to respect the defendant at the remedy
stage as substantively free and equal calls for extending this concern to the
second, self-determination layer as well.
To clarify this point, consider the differences between this ceiling and
bankruptcy justification in terms of character and scope.  Concerning charac-
ter, private law remedies pick out the wrongdoer’s predicament for the pur-
pose of doing relational justice, namely, between him and the victim;
bankruptcy, by contrast, focuses on the debtor’s predicament vis-à-vis the
competing claims of a multiplicity of creditors (and, additionally, on sus-
taining a fair distribution of debt-collection amongst the creditors).  To this
extent, relational justice at the remedial stage provides a reason for setting a
ceiling which does not depend on the justifications underlying bankruptcy
protections.123  Concerning scope, bankruptcy protection often comes too
late and does too little to address the nonwillful wrongdoer’s predica-
ment;124 these shortcomings may or may not be justified from the bank-
ruptcy perspective of doing justice between the debtor and the class of
creditors, but they cannot satisfy the strictly relational demands of doing jus-
tice between the wrongdoer and the victim at the remedial stage.
Hence, private law remedies must assume the responsibility to ensure
the ceiling’s alignment with respecting the wrongdoer as an equal, self-deter-
mining person.  The Boomer scenario of awarding compensation in lieu of an
injunction is not the only context in which this responsibility can be
redeemed in practice.  Part III will show that the doctrine of crushing liabil-
ity, the emerging trend toward abolishing the collateral source rule, and the
122 See infra text accompanying notes 193–204.
123 Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1123, 1143 (2007).
124 Cf. Gilles, supra note 18, at 620–21.
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availability of structured payments of damages awards can and should be
reconstructed along similar lines.
To be sure, a fully operationalized ceiling also requires a principled
treatment of incorporated defendants.  A theory of incorporated persons
that transcends their economic function is an urgent need of private law the-
ory, and we cannot hope to offer it here.  Thus, at this stage, we settle for the
very rough distinction between, on one hand, incorporations which serve as a
ground project of a natural person or group of persons (as in Boomer’s
employees) and, on the other hand, ones that make no such service.125
Floor.  Remedying the wrong must be consistent with recognizing the vic-
tim as an equal, self-determining person.  This straightforward prescription
sets out a floor below which private law remedies cannot go.  For instance, it
means that the size of compensatory damages awards in a negligence case
must not discount the victim’s loss of future earnings, say, merely on account
of her gender or ethnicity (given that the average wage for women or minori-
ties is below the average).126  It also implies that a wrongdoer should be obli-
gated to cover her victim’s physical or emotional harm even when its
magnitude was not reasonably foreseeable given the latter’s thin skull.127
2. Between Precise Rules and Open-Ended Standards
Some scholarly work takes the “remedial discretion”128 that such an
expanded remedial toolkit generates to its seemingly logical conclusion.
This approach celebrates open-ended remedial discretion that authorizes ad
hoc tailoring of remedies to each case based on its particular merits.129  How-
ever, it is objectionable for two independent reasons.  The first reason derives
from the substantial impact of remedies on the content of the primary rights
they are designed to enforce,130 which implies that remedial ad hockery
breeds indeterminacy into primary rights, thus undermining relational jus-
tice.  The second objection to ad hockery is not specific to the law of reme-
dies or to private law, but rather relies on the rule of law.  Ad hockery offends
125 Matters of legal personality and their impact on private law and theory are compli-
cated further still.  Some incorporated entities may fall neither here nor there (consider
research universities as we know them).  We leave this uncharted territory for another
occasion.
126 See infra Section III.D.
127 See infra Section III.E.
128 EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES 4 (2d ed.
2018).
129 See Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion,
15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1425–40 (2015).  For a sophisticated articulation of this position, based
on the claim of an “acoustic separation” between rights and remedies, see Emily L. Sher-
win, An Essay on Private Remedies, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 89, 104–11 (1993); Emily Sherwin,
Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389–96 (2003); Emily Sherwin,
What Civil Remedies Do 1, 14–15 (Oct. 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343144.
130 See DAGAN, supra note 78, at 149.
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against the rule of law because it effectively authorizes courts to exercise
unconstrained power.131
Objecting to ad hockery, however, does not warrant the opposite
approach, namely, that remedies law must always adhere to the rule of bright-
line rules.132  Regulating a wide range of states of the world is complicated,
and an attempt to do so with a set of bright-line rules might generate
counterintuitive complexity.  Such complexity could undermine, rather than
serve, law’s guidance.133  A better approach begins with the observation that
there is ample conceptual space between ad hockery and bright-line rules
within which legal rules and standards provide sufficiently clear guidance as
to what the law requires.  In principle, courts and legislatures can reshape the
content of standards to eliminate the problematics of ad hockery without
necessarily saddling with dogmatic bright-line rules.
Thus, legal standards can—and, often, do—escape their open-ended-
ness when courts or legislatures reduce them to their basic elements.  For
instance, the otherwise obscure standard underlying the doctrine of strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities is rendered intelligible when the ques-
tion of what makes an activity ultrahazardous receives a principled answer,
namely, when exercising reasonable care, or, for that matter, utmost care,
will systematically fail to reduce the activity’s risk to the level of reasonable
safety.134  On this approach (which is not limited to primary rights and
duties), standards should be made to possess recursive structures that would
enable courts and their addressees to identify more or less definitive answers
to particular questions.135
In our case, the key to ensuring that standards maintain their recursive
structure is the existence of basic factors capable of generating a stable
framework with which to address questions of remedies at both the abstract
and the more concrete levels of legal analysis.  Four such factors emerge
131 See Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1889, 1902–03 (2015).  Another rule-of-law worry pertains to remedial ad hockery’s
adverse effects on the ability of law to guide the behavior of its addressees.  This worry may
sometimes be valid, but it is not clear what “behavior” is adversely affected by remedial ad
hockery apart from the one already mentioned in connection with indeterminacy of pri-
mary rights and duties (insofar as their contents rely, in some measure, on their remedial
apparatus). Cf. Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 1, 23,
35–36 (2000).
132 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186–88
(1989); see also, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 18 (2001).
133 See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14, 23, 28, 30 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990).
134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 20(b)(1) & cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2010); Dorfman, supra note 66, at 117–19.
135 For discussion of informative standards (which may be viewed as a minimalist ver-
sion of standards featuring recursive structures), see Hanoch Dagan, Lawmaking for Legal
Realists, 1 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 187, 198–99 (2013).
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from the preceding discussion: voluntariness, the defendant’s predicament,
the plaintiff’s setback, and third-party effects.
3. Four Factors
Voluntariness.  The first factor performs a gatekeeping function.  Volun-
tariness supports a look-back, rather than second-looking, approach to reme-
dies law.  It precludes the consideration of the defendant’s post-breach
predicament where either the parties allocated the pertinent risk among
themselves in a contract or the defendant has maliciously wronged the plain-
tiff.136  Once the gate is open, the idea of just remedial relation requires the
law to focus on the parties’ ex post relations, or more specifically the defen-
dant’s predicament and the plaintiff’s setback.  In other words, the next two
factors explain what might trigger a second-looking approach to remedies
law.
Defendant’s predicament.  This factor considers the condition of the
injurer, and in particular the impact of liability on his or her ability to func-
tion as a substantively free and equal person (which, in the case of a defen-
dant-corporation, can sometimes stand in for its employees and other
persons whose ground projects are substantially implicated in the defen-
dant’s condition).137  The Boomer court is certainly highly attentive to this
impact.138  There are other doctrinal manifestations as well.  The defense of
change of position is a straightforward case in point, according to which a
claim for restitution of a conferred benefit can be reduced to reflect
expenses that would not have been otherwise incurred by the defendant who
is the recipient of the benefit.139  Part III considers other doctrinal resources
with which remedies law accommodates the injurer’s condition.
One important consideration that bears on this factor is liability insur-
ance.  Can’t insuring oneself against liability for nonwillful wrongdoing elimi-
nate one’s predicament?  This question becomes especially important when
the defendant’s predicament is characterized in terms of facing a highly bur-
densome payment of compensatory damages.  (And its importance should
not be confused with an entirely different question concerning compulsory
liability insurance.)140  We argue that a defendant should be estopped from
seeking accommodation for his or her post-wrong predicament if, but only if,
purchasing liability insurance is sufficiently feasible.  Feasibility in this con-
text is a function of the availability of information concerning insurance
options and, most profoundly, the costs of purchasing insurance—clearly,
many potential wrongdoers may lack the wealth to obtain one.  Further, the
extent of the insurance coverage can pose a hurdle even to those who can
136 See supra text accompanying notes 108–21.
137 See supra text accompanying note 125.
138 Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d. 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).
139 See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Relational Justice and the Law of Restitution, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND RESTITUTION 219, 225 (Elise Bant, Kit Barker &
Simone Degeling eds., 2020).
140 See supra note 20 for more on compulsory insurance.
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afford some insurance but, nonetheless, lack the means fully to insure them-
selves against a substantial amount of damages.
We leave for another occasion the next step of figuring out the actual
threshold below which liability insurance counts as infeasible under our skel-
etal definition; this task moves away from theory to highly contextual analysis
of economic factors that will surely vary among places and across activities.
The peculiar arrangement of insurance markets makes the search for a
threshold more complicated still.  Indeed, most schemes of liability insur-
ance, compulsory or voluntarily purchased, come unbundled: they apply to a
particular context, such as homeowner liability insurance, or take up a partic-
ular activity as in the cases of auto insurance and professional malpractice
liability insurance.141  Finally, the challenge of measuring feasibility also has
a distinctively legal dimension—the rule of law’s reluctance to incorporate
inputs concerning insurance feasibility on a purely ad hoc basis would
require some measure of standardization.142  For instance, first-cut distinc-
tions might be helpful, say, between natural and incorporated persons, com-
mercial and nonprofit organizations, laypersons and professionals, and
between occasional and orderly engagement in certain risk-creating
activities.143
Plaintiff’s setback.  Although our account insists that remedies law must
not ignore the defendant’s predicament, it still takes seriously both the
nature and the extent of the plaintiff’s injury.  It is trite to observe that the
law of private law remedies does not reduce the variety of injuries into one
kind.  For instance, tort law allows for recovery for pure economic loss only
exceptionally,144 whereas injuries to life and limb receive the opposite treat-
ment;145 and setback to the plaintiff’s emotional well-being has also been on
the rise for the last several decades, reflecting the modern conviction that
mental health is no less important for sustaining self-determination than its
physical counterpart.146  These distinctions illustrate our claim that not all
rights are made substantively equal in the eyes of the law and that this qualita-
tive heterogeneity is facilitated by the substantial role remedies play in the
141 There are exceptions, such as umbrella insurance, which provides liability insurance
for claims not covered by other policies.  But its coverage is peripheral, rather than
residual.  The very fact that typically there is no one-policy-covers-all attests to the complex-
ity of the current market for liability insurance and, by implication, the legal task of deter-
mining the threshold of feasibility.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 128–135.
143 It appears that tort victims’ lawyers may be implementing this form of reasoning
when determining the size of the damage award they claim on behalf of their clients. See
Baker, supra note 19, at 297, 314.
144 See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1927).
145 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
146 See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010).  Along with
negligent infliction of emotional distress, there exists a tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See, e.g., Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 327 (N.C. 1981).
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enforcement of our interpersonal rights.147  But they can also figure at the
stage of considering the parties’ post-wrong relations.
The reason for this is that the relative importance of addressing the dif-
ferent kind of injuries influences the extent to which an injury deserves a rem-
edy.  This is why courts are (justifiably) reluctant to take into account
burdensome liability as a legitimate consideration when it comes to life and
limb, a reluctance which (properly) fades away when it comes to purely eco-
nomic loss.148  Hard cases, of course, are easily imaginable, such as where the
injury to the victim is economic but severe and so requires a substantial
amount of compensation (or, in a nuisance scenario, an injunctive relief)
which might come at the expense of respecting the wrongdoer as substan-
tively free and equal person.149
Third-party effects.  The preceding analysis, dealing with the three first fac-
tors—voluntariness, defendant’s predicament, and plaintiff’s setback—insu-
lates the interaction between the parties at the remedial level from its effects
on the rest of society.  But remedies can carry important positive and nega-
tive implications for the pre-wrong stage by changing for everyone the prices
of the activities or goods that are the objects of the interaction.  A familiar
case in point is the imposition of strict tort liability for certain product
defects.  Providing remedies for physical injuries resulting from products
defects (including, in the case of manufacturing defect, independently of
fault) will likely have any number of consequences.  The price of the product
might increase and its availability might go down; other effects concern trans-
national competitiveness and product innovation.  Moreover, these conse-
quences may count as good or bad along different dimensions.  For instance,
a price increase has a regressive impact which, from a distributive justice per-
spective, counts as bad.  But the very same effect can be an asset, rather than
a liability, when viewed from a welfarist perspective—it can correct for under-
and over-estimation of product safety by consumers and in this way enable
better informed purchasing decisions.150
We place these third-party effects as the last factor to be considered not
coincidentally.  This way of proceeding is appropriate not only methodologi-
cally but also substantively.  An interaction governed by the private law is, as
noted, a source of concern in and of itself, but nothing in our relational
approach entails the total exclusion of countervailing considerations.  Rela-
tional justice—the justice of private law—is one dimension within a compre-
hensive theory of justice and, so, does not swallow other dimensions of
147 See DAGAN, supra note 78, at 149.
148 Compare Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence,
42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 263 (1992), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444,
447 (N.Y. 1931).
149 See infra Section III.A.
150 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1459–60 (2010).
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justice, such as distributive justice.151  Hence, private law’s remedial frame-
work is not oblivious of third-party effects insofar as they implicate the pur-
suit of relational justice in violations of other dimensions of justice (say, when
doing relational justice creates distributive injustice).
Considering third-party effects expresses our methodological commit-
ment to what may be viewed as theoretical modesty—contrary to familiar
accounts of the intrinsic value of private law, our account does not call for
the categorical exclusion of any society-wide consideration.152  We insist,
however, that they must not undermine private law’s distinctive responsibility
to sustain terms of interactions among substantively free and equal persons.
This responsibility may not be exhausted at the ex-ante level of deciding the
substantive rights of the parties as their post-wrong terms of interactions are
no less crucial to their ability to relate as substantively free and equal.
Finally, we do not deny that integrating these four factors into a unified
legal framework with which to determine what remedies should there be and
how should courts implement them is challenging.  But the Boomer decision
provides an attractive example, since it employs a framework of legal reason-
ing that adheres to private law’s basic facts of interdependence and personal
difference: private law is about, and for, establishing respectful interpersonal
interactions among substantively free and equal persons.153  The relational
structure underlying this conception guides the Boomer court to emphasize
the parties’ post-wrong relations.  In particular, it emphasizes the implica-
tions of the nature and extent of the injury and the condition of the
tortfeasor against the backdrop of the available forms of remedy.  In Boomer,
the remedial choice-set consisting in injunctive relief and permanent dam-
ages forms that backdrop.154  Choosing damages over injunction reflects the
“large disparity” between the injurer’s predicament and the plaintiffs’
sufferings.155
III. JUST REMEDIES
We now move from theory to doctrine and demonstrate how our
account of substantive remedies already shapes parts of the private law of
remedies.  This Part tracks the distinction between determining the ceiling
and the floor of just remedial relations.
We begin with three sets of ceiling-setting doctrines.  They each follow
Boomer’s legacy of accommodating the defendant’s post-wrong condition.
151 But see Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY 293,
319 (2012) (grounding his approach on distributive justice foundations).  Our approach
accommodates distributive considerations, but not at the expense of private law’s basic
commitment to relational justice.
152 Compare WEINRIB, supra note 37, at 19, with Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships,
supra note 60, at 1428–30.
153 See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
154 See id. at 873.  The option of injunctive relief is further divided into immediate and
postponed injunctions. Id.
155 Id. at 872.
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These doctrines are, roughly speaking, akin to an excuse, as opposed to justi-
fication, since they do not presuppose the absence of a complete tort, but
rather seek to accommodate the defendant’s predicament in spite of his or
her wrongdoing by reducing its consequences (in terms of liability).156
The last two Sections of this Part move from ceiling to floor.  The fourth
doctrine, loss of earning capacity, takes up the case of compelling the injurer
to go beyond full compensation, thus showing that at times lifting the floor
up is required in order to vindicate plaintiffs’ equal respect.  The fifth, and
last, doctrine explains the eggshell-skull rule in terms of implementing a sec-
ond look at the post-wrong interactions between the injurer and the victim in
order to address the latter’s predicament in a way that generates substantial
disproportionality between the wrongful conduct and the resulting injury.
Our overall effort is to demonstrate that doctrines in and around reme-
dies law can be reconstructed in terms of the basic commitment to establish-
ing relationally just terms of post-wrong interactions.  On these terms, the
plaintiff and the defendant relate as substantively free and equal.  We empha-
size reconstruction to convey the sense in which our engagement with private
law (judge-made or statutory) is neither merely descriptive nor is it purely
idealist.  Rather, we show how otherwise discrete doctrinal pieces could all
form normative unity by giving effect to relational justice at the remedial
stage.  This oftentimes means refining the doctrines on which we focus, and
at times even reforming some aspects of them.  Such reformist takeaways are
a typical yield of legal theory that is not purely descriptive.
To be sure, not every remedial doctrine that sets plaintiffs’ recovery
below or beyond the compensatory baseline truly amounts to implementing a
principle of second-looking.  As mentioned above, some such doctrines may
be premised directly and exclusively on looking back at the parties’ primary
rights, properly conceived.157  There are other doctrines that limit plaintiffs’
recovery but that cannot be reconstructed as giving effect to relational jus-
tice.  Nothing in our approach necessarily rules them out.  Just as we do not
claim that relational justice must exclusively underpin all primary rights in
contemporary private law, it does not demand exclusivity respecting reme-
dies law; consistent with our commitment to theoretical modesty, other valid
considerations may have a place in remedies law if they do not undermine
relational justice.  Finally, there are also other doctrines that limit recovery,
which cannot be normatively justified within this framework, such as medical
malpractice caps that categorically limit the maximum amount of damages
with no account of either the plaintiff’s post-injury condition or the defen-
dant’s ability to secure the funds necessary to make the plaintiff whole.158
156 Our characterization of just remedial relations (including the Boomer decision) in
terms of excuse contrasts with Keating’s characterization of Boomer in terms of justification.
Keating, supra note 48, at 13, 38.  On the general idea of an excuse, see J.L. Austin, A Plea
for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 12 (1956).
157 See supra text accompanying note 113.
158 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West 2020).
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Nothing in our account should be read as embracing these unjustified
doctrines.
A. Crushing Liability
If imposing liability on a defendant is likely to bring down his or her
livelihood (or calling or other ground project of his or hers), and the
grounds for which liability is sought comes down to inadvertent neglect on
his or her part, and if the damage done by this neglect to the plaintiff—a
business organization—is purely economic, there exists a compelling reason
to make some allowance for the defendant’s predicament.  Our framework of
relational justice at the remedial stage makes sense of the doctrine of crush-
ing liability in terms of this line of reasoning.  Although this doctrine lies in
liability, rather than remedies, we argue that it should stand functionally, if
not formally, for a remedial response to the negligent infliction of economic
loss.  Making allowance for the defendant’s predicament in the case at issue
cannot be satisfactorily explained as a no-duty decision; nor can it turn solely
on the type of the injury (economic loss) caused by the breach of the duty.
Rather, the doctrine serves to excuse, in part or in whole, the defendant’s
otherwise tortious act.
To see this, consider the famous Cardozo decision Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.159  It features a partnership of public accountants hired to prepare
and certify a balance sheet representing the financial condition of a rubber
importer company.160  That company later utilized the sheet to “borrow[ ]
large sums of money from banks and other lenders,”161 including from the
plaintiff.  The defendant was fully aware that its audit would be used by many
potential lenders.162  Soon after the borrower was declared a bankrupt, the
lender-plaintiff pursued the defendant on a theory of negligent misrepresen-
tation (and the jury’s verdict exceeded $2.5 million in today’s inflation-
adjusted value).163  Despite its easily avoidable carelessness, and notwith-
standing Cardozo’s own liability-expanding decisions in MacPherson164 and
Glanzer,165 the Court of Appeals held that the defendant is not liable for the
negligently inflicted economic loss of the plaintiff.166  The doctrinal hook on
which this holding rested was that of “no duty.”
A no-duty explanation has been defended on economic and
noneconomic grounds, to no avail.  Lawyer-economists suggest that account-
159 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
160 Id. at 442.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 The 1926 verdict of the jury was $187,576.32, the inflation-adjusted equivalent of
$2,754,489 in 2020. Id. at 443; Inflation Calculator, US INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://
www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (Oct. 1, 2020).
164 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
165 Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922).
166 Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 447; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 133–36 (2003).
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ants are relieved of the duty not because it is burdensome—after all, account-
ants are not required to take more precautions than they already take toward
their clients.  Rather, the worry pertains to judicial error concerning breach
of the duty, in which case accountants’ potentially high liability would force
overinvestment in precautions to avoid erroneous judgments of breach.167
But this worry is exaggerated.  Essentially, the standard of reasonable care in
the case of accountants (as well as other professionals) is determined by ref-
erence to professional custom, that is, according to the prevailing custom
among accountants, as opposed to more or less educated guesses by the
jury.168  A noneconomic case for no-duty in this context, in turn, concerns
the need to set priorities among the duties accountants (among other profes-
sionals) owe.  It is argued that a no-duty decision enables boundedly rational
accountants to devote care and attention to their clients only (or mainly).169
However, imposing an additional duty of care toward nonclients such as the
plaintiff in Ultramares has absolutely no undermining impact on the account-
ant.  This is a case of overdetermination in the sense that all that the account-
ant must do in terms of discharging care toward the nonclient is exercising
reasonable care toward its client.
By contrast, we argue that the key to making sense of the crushing-liabil-
ity doctrine lies in remedies, rather than duty, law.  Indeed, it is important
not to conflate that hook—“duty”—with the merit of the holding.  It is the
adverse consequences of imposing compensatory damages on the defendant
that drives the analysis from beginning to end.  The doctrine of crushing
liability does not relieve the defendant of the duty to exercise the expertise
and mastery required by his or her professional role as an accountant; rather,
it excuses the defendant from facing at least some of the legal implications of
breaching that duty.
Cardozo’s worry was that of exposing the defendant “to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class.”170  But when this worry of crushing liability does not obtain—as when
the specter of liability is restricted to a clearly delineated special relationship
between the accountant and the lender—the court readily acknowledges the
existence of a duty and, hence, imposes liability for the exact same miscon-
duct and injury.171  We can say that although public accountants are always
duty-bound to exercise reasonable care and expertise when conducting an
audit, they might be entitled to a special allowance—the crushing-liability
doctrine—that operates to relieve them of liability for negligent
misrepresentation.
167 See POSNER, supra note 30, § 21.2, at 595.
168 DOBBS, supra note 21, § 242, at 632–33.
169 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1733, 1833 (1998).
170 Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444.
171 See Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 586–87 (Md. 2000);
Credit All. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. 1985).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 37  8-DEC-20 9:30
2020] substantive  remedies 549
Furthermore, this allowance operates ex post in a manner reminiscent
of the notion of second-looking; in fact, it is designed so as to have virtually
no practical effects on the exercise of care by the accountant.  To begin with,
the court would have allowed full recovery for fraud, as opposed to negli-
gence, insofar as it implicates the defendant in “willfully deceitful” con-
duct.172  This constraint on the accountant’s conduct tracks the framework
of Part II, especially the notion that a principle of second-looking should not
be made available for willful misconduct.  It suggests that accountants cannot
self-consciously convert a duty of reasonable care into a license to conduct
themselves unprofessionally because doing so changes the nature of their
wrongdoing from accidental to willful wrongdoing.  In other words, the doc-
trine of crushing liability departs substantially from a looking-back principle
of remedies law without thereby changing the due-care standard of tort law.
Furthermore, Cardozo emphasizes that the case for relieving the defen-
dant of crushing liability for purely economic losses would also dissipate com-
pletely when the primary concern is, instead, for “unreasonable risk of serious
bodily harm.”173  On our account, the doctrine should be similarly muted
when the plaintiff’s economic grievance is so severe as to place his or her
ground project, not to mention subsistence, on the line.  Arguably, a threat
of this sort explains why, crushing liability to the contrary notwithstanding,
some courts tend to award damages for the pure economic loss suffered by
commercial fishermen as a result of devastating and long-lasting conse-
quences of oil spill.174
Finally, the Ultramares decision does not endorse any form of justice at
the expense of, or in tension with, relational justice.  Cardozo identifies the
notion of crushing liability as the ground for not imposing liability on the
defendant.175  Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Ultramares makes
neither explicit nor implicit reference to the nonrelational concern widely
associated with floodgates arguments—that imposing liability would hyperin-
flate the number of cases making their ways to courts.  According to that
wisdom, the crushing-liability doctrine sacrifices justice in specific cases in
order to conserve “the ends of justice” in the long run.176  This wisdom,
unlike Cardozo’s decision, pits tackling relational injustice against distributive
justice.  By contrast, our account, which is implicit in Ultramares, makes such
pitting unnecessary and indeed unwarranted.  The demands of relational jus-
tice in remedies law are not subservient to those of distributive justice; fur-
thermore, the relational-justice reason for relieving the accountants of
liability does not turn on the prospects of a “mass of litigation.”177  The doc-
172 Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 447.
173 Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
174 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563–69 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying
California law).
175 See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444.
176 Stevenson v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
177 Id.
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trine of crushing liability matters not because it promotes distributive justice,
but rather simply because it sustains relational justice at the remedial level.
B. Collateral Sources
The collateral source rule proscribes the introduction of evidence of col-
lateral sources (such as plaintiff’s first-party insurance) to reduce the defen-
dant’s damage payments by the benefits collateral to the tort action.178  But
the modern trend has been away from this rule and toward permitting
defendants to submit evidence of collateral sources at trial.179  This trend
takes various forms—some states have abolished the collateral source rule
with respect to medical malpractice only, others have retained the rule inso-
far as the insurance company is subrogated to the plaintiff’s entitlements,
and yet others have made no such conditions so that evidence of collateral
benefits is generally admissible.180  A child of a tort reform movement, the
abrogation or limitation of the rule is often explained by reference to the
interest in curbing overcompensation (if, and when, it occurs181).182  By con-
trast, we offer a re-characterization of this emerging trend, putting forward a
very different account of why abrogate and, accordingly, when doing so may be
justified.  The account aspires to offer a radical reorientation for the abroga-
tion of the collateral source rule. Rather than shielding big corporations
from liability, we argue that it should be utilized, subject to the criteria we
provide below, to accommodate defendants facing conditions of genuine
predicament.183
Indeed, the familiar liability-shielding argument from overcompensa-
tion, and the concomitant accusation that the collateral source rule provides
the plaintiff with double recoveries and hence “windfall” profit,184 fails a
basic test of justice.  As the Vermont Supreme Court acutely observed more
than a century ago, “as between the insurer and the wrong-doer, in reason
and justice the burden of making compensation to the injured party ought to
be ultimately borne by the party thus in fault.”185  This observation clearly
takes the heat out of the overcompensation rhetoric by making the straight-
178 See, e.g., Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 208 (Kan. 2010).
179 DOBBS, supra note 21, § 380, at 1059.  A further implication might be to mandate the
deduction of collateral benefits from the damages award. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97
(West 2020).
180 DOBBS, supra note 21, § 380, at 1059–60.
181 The question of whether the plaintiff has in fact received more than he or she needs
to cover for the expected loss depends, in part, on the terms of the insurance policy (and
especially subrogation rights).
182 Overcompensation can have several adverse consequences, including in particular
increasing premiums for malpractice liability insurance. See Glen O. Robinson, The Medical
Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A Retrospective, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5, 32.
183 See infra text accompanying notes 187–200.
184 Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition:
An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 60–61 (2005); Note, Unreason in the
Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 752 (1964).
185 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 539 (1871).
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forward point that the insurer and the defendant do not stand in any morally
relevant relationship to each other—they are not “joint tortfeasors or joint
debtors.”186
But the Vermont court assumes that relational justice as between the
defendant and the plaintiff at the post-wrong stage must never take into
account the defendant’s predicament.187  With respect to negligence, as
opposed to deliberate wrongdoing,188 we deny this much, arguing that that
assumption ought to give way if the following three conditions obtain: first,
compelling the defendant fully to compensate the plaintiff will force the
defendant to forgo the pursuit of a ground project of hers (such as dropping
a course of action she rightfully deems consequential to her pursuit of
ground projects such as law school education); second, the plaintiff is about
to receive sufficient compensation from a collateral source; and third, abro-
gating the collateral source rule would not be utilized systematically (and,
thus, opportunistically) by sophisticated defendants to undermine their
responsibility to either exercise due care189 or purchase, if feasible, liability
insurance.190  Against the backdrop of these three conditions, setting aside
the collateral source rule ought to be permissible, with the only grounds of
permissibility being that of accommodating the defendant’s predicament.
Adopting this framework of remedial relational justice requires thicker
analysis to determine, first, where to draw the principled line between predic-
ament and mere inconvenience and, second, how to proceed with imple-
menting the line drawn in particular cases.  We see no reason to be skeptical
about law’s ability to tackle the task of reducing the notion of defendants’
predicament into a set of informative, down-to-earth and relatively precise
instructions for courts and, ultimately, juries.  Recall the past experience of
introducing comparative negligence to the tort of negligence in the face of
substantial skepticism about the alleged impossibility of reducing the non-
quantitative concept of negligence to percentages;191 or, recall the then
path-breaking decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. to abolish contractual
privity’s rigid constraint on tort liability for negligent infliction of personal
injury.192  Skepticism to the contrary notwithstanding, tort law has largely
overcome these challenges.
186 Id. at 538.
187 Id.
188 The distinction between accidental and deliberate wrongdoers is implicitly reflected
in those statutory schemes that limit the abrogation of the collateral source rule to medical
malpractice. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60G (2020).  But some statutory
schemes make no such, implicit or explicit, distinction. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97
(West 2020).
189 See also supra text accompanying note 170.
190 See supra text accompanying notes 140–43.
191 One of the most influential tort commentators of the day was sympathetic to the
general reluctance on the part of many courts to embrace comparative negligence (in part
for the reason mentioned in the main text above). See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 455–56 (3d ed. 1964).
192 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
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The key to making good on the line-drawing task in connection with the
defendant’s predicament is a theory that helps to determine what counts as a
predicament.  Our account of private law in terms of a commitment to sub-
stantive freedom and equality has introduced such a theory.  Elsewhere we
claim that respect for a person’s ground projects should be the guiding princi-
ple with which to tell predicament—a setback to one’s ground project—from
inconvenience—a setback that leaves intact the ability to pursue one’s
ground project.193  For our purposes, it is enough to give a rough sense of
the predicament/inconvenience distinction.  Forgoing the pursuit of an aca-
demic career or some other calling counts, for example, as a predicament
worthy of addressing (if, recall, the second condition obtains so that the
plaintiff has received sufficient compensation from a collateral source); by
contrast, giving up on an equally expensive leisurely activity (say, skiing on a
vacation) results in inconvenience—including substantial ones—for which
remedies law should make no allowance.194
However, ensuring the justness of the post-wrong relations must not
undermine people’s just terms of interactions,195 which returns our argu-
ment to the third condition identified a moment ago.196  That is, permitting
a defendant, based on her post-wrong predicament, to submit evidence of
collateral sources must not systematically erode the force of private law’s pri-
mary duties.  This worry comes up regarding a specific subset of collateral
source cases, involving sophisticated and legally informed risk creators, with
respect to which a regime that systemically reduces liability where plaintiffs
are insured might lead up to underperformance of tort duties of care and to
underinsurance,197 which undercuts, rather than serves, the parties’ compli-
ance with the requirement of reciprocal respect to substantive freedom and
equality.198  In other words, adopting a strategy of taking less precaution in
expectation of being partially excused of liability is a form of non-accidental
wrongdoing for which no second-looking should be allowed on our
account.199  By the same token, adopting a strategy of purchasing less insur-
193 We further elaborate the notion of ground projects in Dagan & Dorfman, Justice in
Private, supra note 60, at 193–94; Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at
1419–20.
194 See Dagan & Dorfman, Justice in Private, supra note 60, at 193–94; Dagan & Dorfman,
Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1419–20; cf. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570
(9th Cir. 1974).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 78–82.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 189–90.
197 According to one empirical study (not specifically related to the collateral source
rule), personal injury lawyers have worked out a policy of pursuing the opportunistically
underinsured defendants beyond their insurance coverage to capture what these lawyers
call “blood money.”  Baker, supra note 19, at 276, 297, 314.
198 See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1167 (Haw. 2004) (Moon, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 705 (La. 2004)).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 114–21, 171.
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ance coverage counts for setting aside the defendant’s post-wrong
predicament.200
One might suspect that the proposed reconstruction of the collateral
source rule is either unnecessary or even undesirable due to the availability
of bankruptcy and other legal protections.  It may seem unnecessary because
the defendant’s predicament is already taken care of through bankruptcy
law—consider garnishment and homestead exemptions from the otherwise
collectable assets of the defendant-debtor.  And it may even be undesirable
because our approach distorts the delicate balance between the competing
interests of debtors and creditors that these bankruptcy laws strike.  This sus-
picion is unwarranted since it ignores the critical distance between our
reconstruction of the collateral source rule and the various bankruptcy pro-
tections.  As we observed above, bankruptcy protections are neither necessary
nor sufficient parts of a complete ceiling shaped by the liberal commitment
to the substantive freedom and equality of the defendant.201
In particular, bankruptcy protections render noncollectable certain all-
purpose assets (viz., exempt income and homestead) and thus aim at securing
a threshold of decent standard of living at the expense of tort-judgment cred-
itors.202  These assets are linked with the basic ingredients of subsistence such
as having adequate shelter, food, means of transportation, and clothing.203
Their purpose is to ensure that all people (tortfeasors included) could expe-
rience a decent life.  By contrast, the notion of ground projects informing our
reconstruction of the collateral source rule focuses on pursuing a meaningful
life.  And although standards of decent and meaningful life may partially
overlap, they reflect qualitatively different categories of value.  A liberal com-
mitment to substantive freedom and equality insists not only on subsistence,
but also on being able to lead the good life.204
C. Structured Payments
Monetary awards following tort judgments typically come in a lump-sum
form, rather than periodic installments.205  The common law’s preference
for lump-sum awards reflects various institutional considerations pertaining
to the administration of the payment206 as well as substantive considerations
concerning moral hazard.207
200 See supra text accompanying notes 140–43.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 123–25.
202 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2018).
203 See Gilles, supra note 18, at 624, 632.
204 The question of what counts as the good life has received different philosophical
articulations.  Our account does not turn on any one of them and it can be made compati-
ble with many liberal conceptions of the good life.
205 See Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1767 (2002).
206 POSNER, supra note 30, § 6.11, at 192.
207 Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Lump-Sum Versus Period Damage Awards, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 131,
135–37 (1981).
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That said, the tort reforms of the 1970s and 1980s have created a sub-
stantial opening for structured payments, including mandated ones.208  Most
states today provide for some form of period installments in lieu of a lump-
sum amount.209  The intended purposes underlying this trend focus, among
other things, on reducing the severity of medical malpractice claims, tackling
false complaints, and preventing unsavvy plaintiffs from misusing large sums
of money.210  It is unclear whether any of these purposes can and should be
achieved by moving away from lump-sum awards toward periodic
payments.211
Our account gives a novel orientation to the growing recognition of
structured payments that can help reconstruct this doctrine as a laudable
form of administering tort judgments.  Concern for relational justice at the
remedial stage counts against using lump-sum payments if, and only if, the
following two conditions obtain: first, a structured payment helps to accom-
modate the predicament of negligent defendants; and second, it does not
leave the plaintiff worse off relative to receiving a lump-sum award in its
stead.  Concerning the defendant’s predicament, switching to structured pay-
ments could be consequential on one occasion in particular—when paying a
lump sum up front will severely undermine the defendant’s pursuit of his or
her ground projects.  Once again, inconvenience alone cannot bear the bur-
den of justifying the payment deferral integral to the payment form of peri-
odic installments.
Now consider the plaintiff’s condition, and especially the effect of the
timing of the payment on his or her ability to obtain adequate recovery.  Peri-
odic installments are an inadequate form of rectifying the wrong done with
respect to some heads of damages.  For instance, medical expenses accruing
immediately after the injury, post-traumatic emotional harm, and property
damage exemplify cases in which periodic installments might undermine
adequate recovery.  A case for periodic installments, therefore, should be
usually limited to future medical expenses (including medical monitoring)
and loss of earning capacity.
* * *
The three doctrines we have studied thus far—and, potentially, other
practices (such as juries’ forgiving stance toward individuals),212 which we
leave for another occasion—not only give a partial “pass” to wrongdoers; they
also impose the burden for accommodating the post-wrong predicament
onto their victims.  From the traditionalist conception of private law, in which
we have no affirmative interpersonal obligations, forcing a blameless plain-
208 See Pryor, supra note 205, at 1767, 1769.
209 Roger C. Henderson, Designing a Responsible Periodic-Payment System for Tort Awards:
Arizona Enacts a Prototype, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 21, 27–29 (1990).
210 See Pryor, supra note 205, at 1777–78.
211 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Structured Settlements as Structures of Rights, 88 VA. L. REV.
1953, 1955 (2002).
212 See supra note 22.
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tiff—rather than, for example, society as a whole—to accommodate the
defendant’s post-wrong predicament may seem to add insult to injury.  But
this conception of private law fails to account for our primary rights and obli-
gations.213  Likewise, it does not, and should not, typify the law of remedies.
To be sure, as we argued in Part II, there are good reasons to carefully
circumscribe both the burden that can be legitimately imposed on plaintiffs
and the kind of cases in which they can be called on to bear it.  But taking
private law’s underlying commitment to relational justice seriously implies
that a categorical insulation of the remedial stage from the interpersonal
obligation of reciprocal respect to self-determination and substantive equality
is unacceptable even when the beneficiary of the duty of accommodation is a
tortfeasor.
D. Loss of Earning Capacity
We turn now to our fourth and fifth examples of second-looking reme-
dial doctrines.  They involve categories of cases that adjust the plaintiff’s rem-
edy beyond, rather than below, what a traditional view of making the plaintiff
whole prescribes.  Ordinarily, the idea that a tort victim must be made whole
and that this is the tortfeasor’s responsibility resonates well with a framework
of relational justice.  Thus, if a wrongful act causes serious bodily harm it is,
all else equal, the entitlement of the victim to enlist the injurer in the service
of fully compensating her for the medical expenses incurred by the ailing
victim.214  But all else is sometimes not equal.  And the reason for this is that
a measure of full compensation may not be sufficient to reestablish relation-
ally just terms of interactions.  Thus far we have mentioned the defendant’s
predicament as a ground for relieving the injurer of a standard of full com-
pensation.  We now turn to the opposite case of compelling the injurer to go
beyond full compensation.  This and the preceding deviations from full com-
pensation are no mere aberrations.  A commitment to substantive freedom
and equality supports substantive remedies by setting the relationally just
measure of compensation above (or below) that of full compensation.  The
case of lost-earning capacity casts this point into sharp relief.215
Making whole the victim’s injured earning capacity invites a court to pre-
dict “what career path the plaintiff would have taken and what he or she
would likely have earned over a lifetime.”216  At times, a prediction is made
213 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1451–59.
214 It seems that even opponents of the make-whole conception of compensatory dam-
ages in tort law would acknowledge this much. See Goldberg, supra note 75, at 451–52.
215 While we focus on the case of infants and their loss of earning capacity, our analysis
has implications for related questions such as calculating the expected lifespan of the vic-
tim (which, in turn, affects the size of medical expenses as well as the victim’s lifelong pain
and suffering).  We leave these developments to another occasion. See generally MARTHA
CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW
(2010).
216 Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation
of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 44  8-DEC-20 9:30
556 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
relatively straightforward, as when the victim-plaintiff has already established
a sustained career path.  But at other times—as in a tort case featuring an
infant suffering personal injuries—prediction turns on statistical evidence so
as to make up for the lack of particularized information concerning the vic-
tim’s earning capacity.  Traditionally, courts engaged in this context in the
troubling practice of drawing on immutable traits (especially race and gen-
der) as a statistical proxy for the victim’s future earning capacity.217  Empiri-
cally, race and gender are strongly correlated with substantial differences in
earnings (as well as other differences such as life expectancy).  On this
approach, infant victims suffering from a similar personal injury may be
awarded very different sums of damages simply in virtue of their respective
race and/or gender.218  Happily, a recent trend is beginning to emerge,
according to which race- and gender-based prediction of future loss of earn-
ing capacity should be abandoned.
One reason for this shift concerns statistical inaccuracies triggered by
overemphasizing present patterns of discrimination in society at the expense
of factoring into the calculation the future possibility of living in a far less
discriminatory society.219  But courts and commentators also rely on a non-
contingent reason against drawing on race and gender: such proxies must
give way to the demands placed on courts by the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as
well as by federal and state statutory protections against discrimination.  As
state actors, courts are bounded by the constitutional and statutory rights of
the litigants, tort-victims included, who come before them220—it is illegal for
a court, the argument goes, to base tort damages on the traits of the plaintiff-
victim as a member of some protected group.221  Deploying public law—the
Constitution and various civil rights acts—as an external constraint on the
tort-law practice of determining damage awards along these lines implies that
private law is the source of the difficulty: making tort victims whole under
private law doctrine authorizes, indeed enforces, baseless inequalities.
By contrast, our private law framework of just remedial relations rejects
the assumption, shared by both the traditional and the emerging trend, that
tort law raises such difficulty.  Its basic commitment to substantive freedom
and equality rules out the problematic resort to gender and race, irrespective
217 See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and Remedies,
1865–2007, 27 REV. LITIG. 37, 61 (2007).
218 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 661, 676–77 (2017); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-
Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 75
(1994); Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 97–105 (2011).
219 See McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 249–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Wheeler
Tarpeh-Doe. v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 28
F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
220 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 814 (1948).
221 See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); McMillan, 253
F.R.D. at 255–56; see also United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d. 1285, 1319 (D. Utah
2004); Chamallas, supra note 216, at 1441.
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of how much these traits happen to correlate with the victim’s future earn-
ings.  Treating the victim as a genuinely self-determining, equal person is
incompatible with tying future earning capacity with his or her gender (or
race).  Instead, determining future loss of earning capacity must begin with
the normative assumption that, for any self-determining and equal human being, a
career path should not be dictated by such traits or by the (unwarranted)
negative value assigned to them by some members of society.  Engaging in
race- and gender-based damages computation at the post-wrong stage runs
counter to the demands of relational justice.  This traditional practice vio-
lates these horizontal, interpersonal demands, and not merely the vertical
ones placed on courts vis-à-vis litigants.
Our account is no mere replication of the public law objection to using
race-based and gender-based predictions of future earnings.222  Rather, it
preempts the most difficult challenge to this (public law) objection: the
defendant’s asking of “why me?” in the face of the state’s commandeering
support of private persons toward the ends of substantive equality and self-
determination.223  On one of its variations, “the hardest and most intractable
challenge presented by the constitutionalisation of private law” is “the prob-
lem of identifying appropriate duty-bearers.”224  As Hugh Collins explains,
“the project for the alignment of private law with fundamental rights,” which
have been “traditionally regarded” to apply only “to relations between the
citizen and the state,” “presents no obvious candidates for restrictions on who
may be selected as duty-bearers.”225  Adding the cause of distributive justice
will not do either as it, too, fails to answer the defendant’s “why me?” ques-
tion.  That is, it is unclear what could be the basis for enlisting the defendant
in particular in the service of ameliorating injustice in the overall distribution
of resources and opportunities in society.226
This challenge is both important and cumbersome.  Private law, like law
more generally, is a justificatory practice.  Because law claims to have the
legitimate authority to create and enforce rights and duties, its prescriptions
must be justified.  For private law to meet this demand, it is usually not
enough to demonstrate the desirability of the society-wide state of affairs that
would result if the type of complaint a plaintiff raises were to generate the
remedy sought.  Rather, we—and the defendant most immediately—also
need to be convinced that people in the defendant’s category should be duty-
bound to those in the plaintiff’s predicament.227
222 Cf. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 962 (2009).
223 Id.
224 Hugh Collins, The Challenges Presented by Fundamental Rights to Private Law, in PRIVATE
LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 52, at 213, 234–35.
225 Id. at 223.
226 See Avihay Dorfman, Private Law Exceptionalism?  Part II: A Basic Difficulty with the
Argument from Formal Equality, 31 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 5, 11 (2018).
227 See DAGAN, supra note 78, at 110.
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The state-action foundation of prohibiting race- and gender-based dam-
age computations cannot justify to the defendant why she should be forced to
be the agent of remedying the plaintiff’s unjustified harsh predicament.  By
contrast, our theory of relational justice at the remedial stage, which is indig-
enous to private law, does offer such a justification by identifying the missing
link of privity.  Precluding the defendant from relying on such calculations is
based, in our account, directly on the duty of reciprocal respect to substan-
tive freedom and equality.  The emerging nondiscriminatory practice regard-
ing victims’ injured earning capacity need not, therefore, depend on the
policy or collective goals of the state.  The commitment of the private law of
remedies to ensure the parties’ post-wrong just relationship provides it a con-
ceptually secure and normatively principled foundation: it requires the
defendant, rather than merely the court, to respect the plaintiff as a self-
determining, equal human being at the remedial stage.
E. Thin-Skull Rule
Foreseeability with respect to the adverse consequences of one’s action is
partially constitutive of the degree to which a certain act might count as
wrongful.228  According to the thin-skull rule, the scope of tort liability
incurred by tortfeasors extends broadly to cover harm even when its magni-
tude cannot be reasonably foreseeable as it reflects an idiosyncratic condi-
tion—the thin skull—on the part of the victim.229  Such unforeseeability
introduces normative discontinuity between the wrongdoing and the magni-
tude of the harm suffered by the victim: the exceptional magnitude of the
harm that occurred cannot be cast in terms of the wrongful risk out of which
it came about.230  This means that the thin-skull rule deems the risk-creator
liable even for adverse consequences that could not have figured ex ante in
her (or any other reasonable risk-creator’s) decision about the kind and the
amount of precautions that should have been taken.  It is, in other words, a
rule of damages, rather than proximate causation.231
Consider the English negligence case of Smith v. Leech Brain, featuring a
small spattering of molten metal that caused both a small “burn on his lip”
and a terminal cancer which was attributed to the peculiar condition of the
228 The connection between foreseeability, duty, and liability is further explored in
Avihay Dorfman, Foreseeability as Re-Cognition, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 163 (2014).
229 See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891).  To be sure, the rule does
not overcome an unforeseeable type of injury.  Whereas the type must be foreseeable to
satisfy the proximate-cause element, the scope of the injury need not be foreseeable if, and
only if, the thin-skull rule applies. See Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. [1962] 2 QB 405, 415.
230 See Avihay Dorfman, Can Tort Law Be Moral?, 23 RATIO JURIS. 205, 225–26 (2010).
231 Indeed, the rule “kicks-in” only after the plaintiff has managed to prove that the
defendant’s wrongdoing has satisfied all the elements of the prima facie case of the tort,
including proximate causation and (some) injury.  Then, and only then, can the plaintiff
argue that the size of the compensatory damages ought to reflect the full magnitude of the
harm, including its unforeseeable aspects.
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victim.232  Explaining why the full cost of the injury should be borne by the
negligent defendant may not find secure grounds in the primary duty of care
it owed the victim, since such a duty cannot possibly aim at reducing unfore-
seeable risks.233  Hence, were the Smith court to adopt only a principle of
looking back at the primary right to bodily integrity of the victim, it would
not have a reason to recognize his predicament as implicating the defen-
dant’s duty of due care and the liability for its breach.  The victim’s predica-
ment might become legally cognizable only if, instead, the court takes a
second look at the post-wrong interaction between the victim and the
tortfeasor.
A framework of relational justice at the remedial stage and the resultant
category of substantive remedies further develops this prescription by
explaining, first, what is it in the post-wrong interaction that invites second-
looking and, second, what is the proper scope of the thin-skull rule.234  Con-
cerning the first, the rule entitles the plaintiff, including when she could not
have been aware of her special condition, to have her idiosyncratic situation
determine unilaterally the post-wrong terms of the interaction with the
tortfeasor.  This way of treating the parties at the remedial stage reflects a
concern for their ability to relate as substantively free and equal.  Pitting the
defendant’s predicament against the plaintiff’s setback reveals an important
imbalance in their post-wrong conditions: compensating the thin-skulled vic-
tim is both a means to reclaiming (the economic equivalence of) her bodily
integrity and an economic shortfall on the part of the tortfeasor.  Thus, the
monetary value of a damage award implicates the freedom interests of the
parties in importantly different ways.  Accordingly, if the parties are to relate
as substantively free and equal at the remedial stage, the law must respond to
this difference by holding the tortfeasor liable for the injury to the victim’s
thin skull.  The thin-skull rule, in other words, builds a second-look mecha-
nism into remedies law.
The preceding discussion contains the normative seeds for addressing
the second question concerning the proper scope of the thin-skull rule.  In
particular, it supports extending the rule to capture thin emotional skull, but
denies similar treatment to thin proprietary skull.235  The extension to emo-
tional condition that is unexpectedly and unusually fragile is explained by
the normative significance of emotional well-being to leading a life as a genu-
inely free and equal agent, which—like bodily integrity—gets priority over
232 Smith, [1962] 2 QB at 408.
233 See DOBBS, supra note 21, § 188, at 465.
234 We leave further discussions of competing theoretical accounts of the thin-skull rule
for another occasion.  Representative accounts are Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and
the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 96–98 (1975); Richard
A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 195–97 (1973); Dennis
Klimchuk, Causation, Thin Skulls and Equality, 11 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 115, 132 (1998).
See, more recently, Steve P. Calandrillo & Dustin E. Buehler, Eggshell Economics: A Revolu-
tionary Approach to the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 375 (2013).
235 Limited space compels us to leave the case for or against extending the rule to what
can be called religiously thin skull for another occasion.
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the defendant’s economic costs.  This form of reasoning from the normative
significance of bodily to emotional integrity receives ample support in the
caselaw.236
By contrast, a framework of relational justice at the remedial stage cuts
against extending the thin-skull rule to things whose unusually delicate condi-
tion is at least for the defendant unforeseeable.  The need to decide whether
unusually thin property entitles its owner to recover the entire property dam-
age arises when the unusual magnitude of the damage could not have been
reasonably foreseen due to some unexpected fragility on the part of the dam-
aged property.  The (very scarce)237 caselaw and the few commentators to
have taken up the thin-proprietary rule tend to, implicitly or explicitly, down-
play the difference between the plaintiff’s person and property.238  Thus, in
one of the few exceptional cases that prove the rule, according to which the
thin-skull rule does not apply to mere stuff,239 the court observed that “the
evidence suggests that a building rather than a person may have had an ‘egg-
shell skull’” and simply asserted that “[t]hat possibility alone does not fore-
close liability for the injury.”240  Our principled method of approaching the
matter provides a source of critical counterpoint.  Moving from bodily (or
emotional) integrity to property integrity affects how the law should assess
the balance of freedom and equality between the interacting parties.  That
move transforms an asymmetric interaction, in which accommodating the
plaintiff’s bodily predicament is normatively prior to the resulting economic
setback to the defendant, into a more symmetric one, in which the proprie-
tary predicament of one may be normatively indistinguishable from the set-
back to the other.  Hence, the thin-skull rule should not be extended to the
property context.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The field of remedies law, as leading remedies scholars acknowledge, is
no mere “miscellaneous jumble.”241  Nor is it simply the historical upshot of
the law vs. equity divide.  After all, the remedial principle of second-looking,
as Part II shows, is not reducible to a safety valve that operates in the second
order, that is, on top of the default rules of the common law.  And as Part III
236 See, e.g., Bryan v. City of New Orleans, 737 So. 2d 696, 698 (La. 1999); Ragsdale v.
Jones, 117 S.E.2d 114, 117–18 (Va. 1960).
237 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 31
cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010).
238 See, e.g., id.; Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1491 (2003).
239 Martin v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. B142528, 2002 WL 31117056, at *8 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002), is another one of those exceptions. See P.J. Rowe, The Demise of the Thin Skull
Rule?, 40 MOD. L. REV. 377, 381 (1977).
240 Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Gay, 680 N.E.2d 407, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
241 Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 262
(2008). But see Tim Kaye, A Sound Taxonomy of Remedies, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 79, 85
(2017).
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further demonstrates, the second-look orientation embedded in our account
cuts across the traditional divide between legal and equitable remedies to
capture also the quintessential common-law remedy of compensatory dam-
ages.242  Instead, modern remedies law amalgamates otherwise discrete
pieces of doctrine, caselaw, and practical wisdom into a unified body of law.
But what is the basic idea or ideas around which these pieces might come
together?
Rather than adopting a common-denominator approach, according to
which remedies law consists of the “general principles about the law of reme-
dies that cut across substantive fields [of law],”243 we have made the case for
a novel architecture of the field.  It begins with distinguishing private law
remedies from its public law counterpart.  Private law and its remedial appa-
ratus, we argue, are best understood as governed by the basic idea of rela-
tional justice, namely, the commitment to determining terms of interactions
among substantively free and equal persons.  This idea, in turn, gives rise to a
bifurcated architecture: one set of remedies looks back at, and indeed
enforces or vindicates, the primary rights and duties of the parties; and
another, hitherto neglected set, is tasked with implementing a second look at
the respective post-wrong conditions of the defendant-plaintiff interaction so
as to make it a just remedial relation.
A comparison of Boomer244 and Cashin245—two canonical cases we have
discussed—brings home the distinction between looking back and second-
looking, and thus the architecture of remedies law.  Both Boomer and Cashin
affirm the idea of relational justice at the remedial stage.  However, recall
that this affirmation generates completely different outcomes—Boomer is
associated with second-looking as it ends up ordering permanent compensa-
tory damages in lieu of injunctive relief,246 whereas Cashin propounds a look-
back approach by awarding super-compensatory damages to prevent the
defendant from treating the plaintiff as a mere cost.247  This divergence can
be explained by reference to two aspects that, taken separately, are highly
significant to this Article’s account of just remedial relations.
First, the two cases focus on qualitatively different underlying types of
plaintiff’s vulnerability, namely, to reasonable enjoyment of one’s property
and to life and limb, respectively.  A liberal account of substantive freedom
242 It is of course true that equitable remedies are generally associated with allowing
more judicial discretion than their common-law counterparts. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick,
The Challenge of Remedies, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 739, 745 (2013).  But this observation also
cannot be enough.  First, equitable remedies do not invite “free-floating discretion” on the
part of the judge. In re Chicago, 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986).  Second, discretion in
the case of common-law remedies does exist, say, in the rather wide discretion granted to
the jury in determining damage awards. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAM-
AGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION § 814(4), at 659 (2d ed. 1993).
243 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, at xxix (3d ed. 2002).
244 Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
245 Cashin v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 28 P.2d 862 (Mont. 1934).
246 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875.
247 Cashin, 28 P.2d at 871.
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and equality cannot treat these vulnerabilities as though they are on a par.248
It means that implementing a second-look orientation in the former case is
hardly a reason to do the same in the latter given the kind of vulnerability
that is at stake.  Second, Boomer, recall, is a case of accidental wrongdoing.  By
contrast, Cashin features nonaccidental, malicious wrongdoing which, there-
fore, counsels against accommodating the defendant’s predicament and in
favor of enjoining its workers either prior to or, as it actually happened, after
the fact.
Working out the implications of reconstructing remedies law in terms of
a look-back/second-look architecture gives rise to two interventions we
offered in the Article, concerning the questions of “what is” and “what
should.”  A framework of just remedial relations renders more intelligible
private law’s adherence, at the remedy level, to the basic liberal commitment to
interpersonal interactions among substantively free and equal persons.  Oth-
erwise unrelated doctrines are in fact instantiations of the same moral com-
mitment.  The other intervention is on display when our framework provides
the normative resources necessary to reforming other doctrines (consider
the damage head associated with loss of earning capacity) to make remedies
law more loyal to that same laudable commitment.
248 See Dagan & Dorfman, Just Relationships, supra note 60, at 1431–35; Dorfman, supra
note 66, at 111–14.
